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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-IMPLIED WARRANTIES GOVERNED BY
LAW OF THE STATE MOST CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE
CONTRACT
Plaintiff's suit in a federal district court in Indiana sought damages
from the manufacturer of an intramedullary pin for breach of an
implied warranty of fitness.' The basis for the alleged breach of warranty was the existence of a defect in the pin.2 In allowing recovery,
the court found the defect to be the "proximate cause" of a thirtysix month delay in healing. A Michigan company originally purchased the pin by mail order from defendant, an Indiana manufacturer. The pin was supplied to a Michigan hospital where it was
inserted in plaintiff's leg in treatment of injuries sustained in an
automobile accident. Defendant contended that Indiana law, as to
implied warranties, should govern since the contract of sale was
made in Indiana. The court rejected this contention 3 and applied
Michigan law.4 On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
held, affirmed. The law governing the implied warranties arising
from a sale contract is that of the state "most closely associated" with
the contract. Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg..Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960).
The "grouping of contacts" or "center of gravity" theory, which
results in application of the law of the state most closely associated
with the contract, is a reaction to the frequently unjust result of the
older conflict rules.5 Advocated by distinguished scholars6 in this
1. Plaintiff's suit is on separate counts for negligence in manufacture and

breach of implied warranty of fitness. Only the latter will be discussed.
2. In testing the pin, medical laboratory experts found it to be cracked.
In this condition the pin would not bear the proper weight, thus allowing too
much flexibility within the leg for proper healing. Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co.,
277 F.2d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 1960).
3. In a diversity case a federal court applies the choice of law rule of the
state in which it is sitting. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1941). So in the instant case the federal court sitting in Indiana would
apply the Indiana conflict of laws rule which, as counsel on both sides agreed,
is best expressed in W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417
(1945). See discussion infra note 9.
4. The Michigan law of implied warranties does not bar an action against a
manufacturer by a consumer because of lack of privity of contract between
the parties. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353
Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
5. Referring to the older conflict theories, commonly known as the "place
of contracting" or "place of performance" tests, the Restatement says that
"except as stated in § 358, the law of the place of contracting determines
what are the obligations of a sealed instrument, a mercantile instrument, or
any other contract." RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 346 (1934). "The duty
for the performance of which a party to a contract is bound will be discharged
by compliance with the law of the place of performance of promise...." Id.

§ 358.

6. CHEATHAm, DOWLING, GOODRICH & GRiswoLD, CONFLICT OF LAWS 411, 478,
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field, this theory is in effect the rationalization of the results reached
in many court decisions.7 Its name was coined by Professors Harper
and Taintor less than two decades ago8 but was not actually stated
as the rule being adopted by a court until 1945 in W. H. Barber Co. v.
Hughes.9 Since that time, the number of courts adopting the rule
and the contract situations to which it has been applied have greatly
increased. Its use has been extended from cases of ordinary contracts 10 to those concerning suits on notes," and to controversies over
the existence of implied promises in express contracts. 12 It is now
extended to the field of warranties by the instant case. The "center of
gravity" rule has been described as a "revolutionary" step 13 although
courts have unwittingly used it for many years. Its future extension
is almost assured by its approval in the recent tentative draft of the
14
Restatement.
The instant case, in applying Indiana conflict rules, expressly followed the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contracts" test as set
out in Barber.15 The court apparently reasoned that although a contract of sale was made in Indiana, the ultimate delivery and use in
Michigan is of such importance as to give the latter the more intimate
contact with the contract. The instant holding, that the "center of
gravity" theory is applicable in determining which state law governs
the right of a consumer to sue a manufacturer on implied warranty
of fitness, is an extension of the theory to a situation where a third
party is the plaintiff.16
Adoption of the "center of gravity" rule reaches an equitable result
and leaves the court unhampered by rules which compel less fortunate
decisions. This theory enables the courts to treat the parties more
511 (2d ed. 1941); HARPER & TAINTOR, CONFLICT OF LAws 173, 175 (1937).
7. W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1945).
8. HARPER & TAINTOR, CONFLICT Or LAWS 173 (1937).

9. 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945). The court says, "So far as we know
it has not been formulated by any court into a rule, but if one were attempted
it.might be stated as follows: The court will consider all acts of the parties
touching the transaction in relation to the several states involved and will
apply as the law governing the transaction the law of that state with which
the facts are in most intimate contact." Id. at 423. See discussion in Harper,
Policy Bases of the

Conflict of Laws, 56 YALE L.J. 1155, 1166 (1947).

10. Separation agreement between husband and wife. Auten v. Auten, 308
N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
11. W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, supranote 7.
12. Metzenbaum v. Golwynne Chem. Corp., 159 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
13. "The instant case [Auten] is revolutionary in scope, departing from the
orthodox rules of the conflict of laws." 22 BROOKLYN L. REV. 146, 147 (1955).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332b at 30-31 (Tent. Draft

No. 6, 1960), with supporting authority cited in Reporter's Note at 35-38. The
present Restatement does not recognize the theory.
15. See note 9 supra.
16. It should be noted that by extending the theory to implied warranty
situations where plaintiff may also choose to sue in tort for negligence, the
question is raised as to whether there is also an extension to tort suits.
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fairly than was possible under the logic of older theories. There
are two valid criticisms of this theory: "1) litigants may be deprived of any certainty as to the outcome of a given case; 2) the
theory might furnish a convenient means for justifying the desired
result .... ,"17 The disadvantages become less significant, however,
when balanced against the benefits derived from allowing the state
most concerned with the outcome of the litigation to apply its own
law.18 In answer to the first criticism, it must be noted that the
tentative draft of the Restatement19 allows the parties to make an
express choice of law, thus giving certainty. As to the second criticism, it would seem an advantage to allow the court to consider which
state rule would produce the most practical results taking into
account the probable intention of the parties. In addition, the difficult
determination as to the place of contracting or the place of performance is avoided. 21 The theory has functioned well for the courts
and will probably enjoy wide acceptance in future litigation.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-ABSOLUTE
STATUTORY PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF CONTRACEPTIVES
NOT A VIOLATION OF RIGHTS SECURED BY FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Plaintiffs, a licensed physician and five of his patients,' sought
declaratory judgments to determine the constitutionality of Connecticut statutes2 which prohibit the use and counseling or aiding in
the use of drugs or instruments for the purpose of preventing con17. Note, 3 UTAH L. REV. 490, 498-99 (1953).
18. Ibid.

19. Supra note 14.
20. "[I]t enables the court not only to reflect the relative interests of the
several jurisdictions involved.... but also gives effect to the probable intention of the parties and consideration to 'whether one rule or the other produces
the best practical result.'" Auten v. Auten, supra note 10, at 103. (Citations
omitted.)
21. "[M] any difficult questions with respect to the identification of the place
of contracting or the place of performance will be avoided. . .
TANTOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS 175 (1937).

."

HAipER &

1. For the purposes of this litigation, these plaintiffs are using fictitious
names.
2. CONN.GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1949): "Use of drugs or instruments to prevent

conception. Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument
for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty
dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be
both fined and imprisoned."
CONN. GEm. STAT. § 54-196 (1949): "Accessories. Any person who assists,
abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense
may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender."
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ception. All plaintiffs alleged a violation of their rights under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The physician
contended that insofar as the statutes prohibited the prescribing of
contraceptives for the health of his patients, they constituted an undue restriction upon the practice of his profession. The patients
alleged that since they were unable to conceive normally and
safely, the prohibition against the use of contraceptives infringed
upon their right to life and health. They asserted that the statutes
were valid only if construed to include an exception permitting a
duly licensed physician to prescribe contraceptives for the protection
of health. The trial court found against the plaintiffs and on appeal
to the Supreme Court of Errors, held, affirmed. A state statute prohibiting without exception the use of contraceptives is not a deprivation of private rights secured by the fourteenth amendment; nor is
the judiciary empowered to imply an exception in the face of legislative intent to the contrary. 3 Buxton v. Ullman, 156 A.2d 508 (Conn.
1959).
The exercise of the regulatory powers of the state is aimed at those
objectives that further the health, safety, and welfare of the general
public. The guaranty of due process does not prohibit the exertion
of this admitted governmental power, but only demands that the
means adopted be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
legislative purpose. 4 The enactment of these regulatory measures
invariably involves some restriction upon individual rights and
privileges; however, it is only when the restraint bears no reasonable
relationship to the statutory objective that there is an infringement
upon the substantive due process guarantees of our Constitution. As
the inference of reasonableness rests on human judgment, the courts
give great weight to the legislative evaluation of the reasonableness
of the relationship.5 There is unanimity among the jurisdictions
that some regulation of contraceptives has a justifiable relation to the
protection of public morals, and consequently amounts to a valid
exercise of the sovereign power of the state. 6 The courts have ex3. The court relied for its refusal to imply an exception upon the legislative
history of the act, considering that the continuing refusal of the legislature to
amend was conclusive evidence that the statute was intended to be allinclusive. See the legislative history of the attempted amendments in the
instant case. 156 A.2d at 513.
4. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905).
5. Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903).
6. People v. Sanger, 222 N.Y. 192, 118 N.E. 637 (1918); McConnell v. City
of Knoxville, 172 Tenn. 190, 110 S.W.2d 478 (1937); State v. Arnold, 217 Wis.
340, 258 N.W. 843 (1935). These cases are representative of decisions sustaining
the constitutionality of contraceptive statutes which provide for an express
exception for medical use of contraceptives prescribed by physicians. For a
collection of state contraceptive statutes see Hudson, Birth Control Legislation, 9 CLEv.-MAl~. L. REv. 245 (1960).
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plained this relationship on the basis that the suppression of the
use of contraceptives promotes public morality in that it limits extramarital intercourse.7 Both the New York8 and federal statutes9 allow
an exception for proper medical use of contraceptive devices, the
former by statutory exceptions and the latter by judicial construction. 10 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, contending with
a similar statute," has twice refused either to go beyond the statutory
language and imply an exception or to hold that absolute restraint
of use denies its citizens any substantive rights under the due process
clause. 12 Two previous Connecticut courts 3 construed section 53-32
and reached the same result as the instant case, but in the former
cases the court was confronted only with a physician's claims of due
process infringements. The courts simply concluded that the law was
a valid exercise of the state regulatory power and refused to substitute
its judgment for that of the legislature. Beyond this treatment the
constitutional issues received little analysis.
7. Most of the statutes in this field such as the Connecticut, New York and

federal enactments were originally part of a general obscenity law. This
legislative history would indicate that contraceptives were viewed as articles
obscene per se and not entitled to uncontrolled public distribution. See Note,
Judicial Regulation of Birth Control Under Obscenity Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 682
(1941).
8., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1142. Sales, loans, or gifts of contraceptives are prohibited. Medical prescriptions are exempted from the provisions of this
statute.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958). Articles used to prevent conception and publications advertising the sale or describing the use of contraceptive measures are
excluded from the United States mail.
10. United States v. One Package, 13 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); United
States v. Davis, 62 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1933); Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C. I. Lee
& Co., 45 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1930).
11. MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 272 § 21 (1932). Advertising, manufacture, or gift
of contraceptives is also prohibited by this statute.
12. Commonwealth v. Gardner, 300 Mass. 372, 15 N.E.2d 222 (1938), appeal
dismissed, 305 U.S. 559 (1939) (no substantial federal question). Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 265 (1917). These courts decided
the constitutional question by a virtual assumption of validity. There is some
question as to the status of these decisions in Massachusetts since the same
court that decided the Gardnercase just two years later seemed to align itself
with the federal courts by indicating that it was the illegal use of contraceptives that the legislature intended to prohibit. Commonwealth v. Corbett,
307 Mass. 7, 29 N.E.2d 222 (1938). The defendant in that case was a druggist
who was prosecuted by the state for selling condoms. The court recognized
the dual capacity of the article, as being usable either to inhibit conception
or to prevent venereal disease. The prosecution has to prove that the defendant was aware that the item was to be used for contraception (an illegal use)
rather than for the prevention of venereal disease (a legal use). This latter
case did not involve the claim of a patient alleging damage to her health, but
the court's rationale is authority for implying a medical exception to the
statute.
13. Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d 582 (1942), appeal dismissed,
318 U.S. 44 (1943) (plaintiff's physician had no standing to assert the constitutional claims of patients who were not parties to the action); State v. Nelson,
126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940). The legislature's refusal to amend the
statute was sufficient evidence of its intent to prescribe a complete prohibition.
But cf. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
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The addition of the patients as party plaintiffs in the instant case
was not deemed a sufficient basis for a departure from the two
previous decisions. The court found no substantial distinction between the rights of the physician and those of the patients, and thereby enlarged the scope of prior holdings to include both the dispenser
and user of contraceptives. As in the previous cases, the court gave
conclusive weight to the legislative attempts to amend section 53-32
and held that the injection of an exception into the statute was
legally impossible.
The court's refusal to imply an exclusion for a justified medical
use seems an overly rigid construction of the statute. There is substantial authority for implying such an exception, both with respect
to contraceptive statutes 14 and to legislation dealing with such analogous subjects as prohibition of abortions 15 and compulsory vaccination.16 Essentially the problems of statutory construction and
constitutionality are both susceptible to treatment in terms of reasonableness. The courts which have implied an exception have indicated
an apparent unwillingness to assume that the legislature intended the
arbitrary result of a total restraint. 17 Therefore, the principal attention of this comment will be turned to the constitutional issues.
The purpose ascribed to the Connecticut legislature is an attempted
suppression of illicit intercourse. 18 The argument is urged that since
a fear of pregnancy deters such intercourse, the free availability of
contraceptives encourages promiscuity. The Connecticut court's discussion of the reasonableness of the regulation involved no balancing
of the evils to which the law is directed against the resulting individual hardships. The judicial problem of defining the reasonableness of a regulation is ultimately one of choosing between competing
values of social legislation and individual restrictions. The less important the social values, the less curtailment of individual interests
is permissible. 19 The legislative objective was not properly balanced
in the instant case against the injuries to the marriage consortium,
the dangers of continual production of mentally abnormal or physical14. Supranote 10.
15. flours v. United States, 229 Fed. 960 (5th Cir. 1915); State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592 (1928); State v. Rudman, 126 Me. 177, 136
Atl. 817 (1927).
16. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904). A compulsory vaccination statute was held to be constitutional, but the court said by way of dictum
that the provisions of the statute could not be applied against individuals
whose health would thereby be injured.
17. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, employing rather broad

language, stated that: "The intention to prevent a proper medical use . . .
merely because they are capable of illegal uses is not lightly to be abscribed
to Congress." Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C. I. Lee & Co., 45 F.2d 103, 108 (2d
Cir. 1930).

18. State v. Nelson, supra note 13, at 425, 11 A.2d at 862.
19. ROTTSCIAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 455 (1939).
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ly defective children, the threat to family stability by forced sexual
abstinence, 20 the desirability of the economic spacing of children, the
relationship between illegal abortions and the failure to use contraceptives, 21 the social need for limiting the general population, 22 the
overwhelming approval by American physicians of the use of contraceptives as a medical technique,2 3 and, of course, the possible injury
to health or life by conception. Does the social evil warrant the
hardships that result from such restraints on individual rights? A
court in answering this question must also consider whether the
regulation is a reasonable attempt to abate the evil. Doubt is cast
upon the effectiveness of this regulation as a means of accomplishing
the objective by the national growth of the contraceptive industry in
spite of the burden imposed by many regulations,2 the flourishing
bootleg activity in contraceptives, 25 and the fact that the per capita
birth rate of Connecticut and Massachusetts does not exceed the
national average. 26 Total prohibition against use is not an essential
ingredient of a regulatory measure. Rational control of distribution
could achieve the same result without the harmful consequences,
which are the inevitable offshoots of such rigorous restraints. What
might have been in 187927 proper justification for a regulation could
on the basis of improved medical knowledge become an arbitrary
infringement upon guaranteed rights. It is hoped that the United
States Supreme Court, which has noted probable jurisdiction,28 will
favor the constitutional questions with better treatment.
20. The theory proposed by many medical authorities and marriage con-

sultants is that the denial of sex to either spouse is an important factor in
domestic discord. The physical stress and emotional disturbance that results
from sexual abstinence in many cases completely disrupts marriage harmony.
STONE: & ABRAHAM, A MARRIAGE MANUAL 204 (1937).
21. COLDERONE, ABORION IN THE UNITED STATES 182 (1958).
22. COOK, HUMAN FERTIITY (1958); HUXLEY, THREE ESSAYS ON POPULATION
(1960).
23. The clinical effectiveness of the vaginal diaphragm and condom has been
demonstrated to be superior to other conception control measures, including
the rhythm 'natural' method sanctioned by the Connecticut statute. LIETZE,
THE CONDOM AS A CONTRAcEPTIV 36 (Publication No. 5, National Committee
on Maternal Health 1960).
24. The Accident of Birth, Fortune, February, 1938, p. 83 at 85.
25. Id. at 110.
26. SAx, STANDING ROOm ONLY 185 (1955).

27. The date of the original enactment of the law by the Connecticut Legislature.
28. 362 U.S. 987.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOMS OF SPEECH AND
PRESS-ORDINANCE PROHIBITING DISTRIBUTION OF HAND
BILLS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OF AUTHOR VIOLATES
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The petitioner was convicted in Los Angeles Municipal Court of
violation of a Los Angeles ordinance' which provided that no handbills should be distributed in any place, or under any circumstances,
unless they had printed on their covers the names and addresses of
the persons who printed, distributed, or sponsored them. The highest
state court available to the petitioner affirmed. 2 On certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. 3 A municipal
ordinance prohibiting the distribution of any hand-bills which do
not contain the names and addresses of the persons responsible for
them is void on its face as an abridgement of the freedoms of speech
and press. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
The freedoms of speech and press are protected from abridgement
by state action through the first and fourteenth amendments. 4 These
freedoms are among those which are acknowledged as having a "preferred position" in relation to other constitutional freedoms, 5 although
some dissent has been voiced as to the validity of this concept when
"it carries the thought ...

that any law touching communication is

infected with presumptive invalidity. ' 6 Therefore, a statute or ordinance seeking to limit or restrict them under the state's power to
protect the public health, safety, and welfare must be engendered by
a "clear and present danger" to such public interests.7 Furthermore,
1. The relevant parts of the ordinance provide as follows: "No person
shall distribute any hand-bill in any place under any circumstances, which
does not have printed on the cover, or the face thereof, the name and
address of the following: (a) The person who printed, wrote, compiled or
m16nufactured the same. (b) The person who caused the same to be distributed; provided, however, that in the case of a fictitious person or club,
in addition to such fictitious name, the true names and addresses of the
owners, managers or agents of the person sponsoring said hand-bill shall
also appear thereon." Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 28.06 (1955).
2. People v. Talley, 172 Cal. App. 2d 797, 332 P.2d 447 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. Los Angeles County 1958), cert. granted, 360 U.S. 928 (1959).
3. Mr. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Harlan
concurred in a separate opinion. Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Whittaker, dissented.
4. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
5. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
The origin of the "preferred freedoms" concept is usually ascribed to a foot-

note in the much maligned case of United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938).
6. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949).

Mr. Justice Frankfurter,

concurring, discusses the historical development of the concept of "preferred freedoms," deploring the "ways of mechanical jurisprudence through
the use of oversimplified formulas." Id. at 96.
7. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

"But the character of
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except in highly unusual circumstances, 8 these freedoms are favored
in that no expression, damaging as it may be, can be prohibited in
advance of its utterance, though of course such utterance may be
subsequently penalized. 9 Likewise, any broad, general ordinance
which restricts freedom of expression, and is not limited to the regulation of health, safety and welfare, is void on its face. 10 It has been
determined that hand-bills fall within the general protection given
to these freedoms." A state may, however, in protecting the public
interests, prohibit commercial advertising on the streets;12 or doorto-door solicitation and distribution of commercial advertising.13 The
important and interesting question of the relation between anonymity
and the freedom of expression raised in this case is not so well
settled as the questions regarding the distribution of the pamphlets.
The Supreme Court has upheld a provision of the Federal Post Office
Appropriation Act requiring, as a condition precedent to the entering
of newspapers as second class matter in the mails, that the names and
addresses of the editors of the paper and other information be disclosed. 14 The rationale behind this decision, however, is that the low
postal rates given to second class mail constitute a privilege granted
by the federal government, and as such are subject to regulation.
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.... The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man
from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of
The question in every case is whether the words used are used
force ....
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent." Id. at 52. (Emphasis added.) For application of
this doctrine against a state, see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 536 (1945).
8. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1931) (obstruction
of recruiting service; advocating rebellion in war-time; publication of troop
sailing dates in war-time).
9. Id. at 713-23.
10. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161-63 (1939).
11. "The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals.
The press in its historic
It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets ....
connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle
of information and opinion." Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
For a case where a broad, general ordinance prohibiting the distribution of
hand-bills was held void on its face, see Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,

161-63 (1939).

12. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The court here expressly
states the law in regard to the distribution of information in the streets:
"This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the
exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating

opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately

regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden
or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally

clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as re-

spects purely commercial advertising." Id. at 54. A state, however, may not
prohibit the distribution of religious hand-bills in the streets even though
they in part advertise the sale of religious books. Jamison v. Texas, 31a
U.S. 413 (1943).
13. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
14. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
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Likewise, the requirements of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying
Act that a lobbyist register and give the names and addresses of the
persons who sponsor him has been reconciled with the freedoms of
speech and press, 15 the Court holding that Congress has sufficient interest in protecting itself from having the voice of the public drowned
out by special interest groups to pass such regulations. 16 Though
the question has never been adjudicated in the Supreme Court, it
would seem that a state has a right to prohibit anonymous handbills which are designed to injure or defeat any candidate for nomination to public office.' 7 Analogously, the anonymity of a member of
an organization which uses the "secrecy surrounding its purposes and
membership as a cloak for acts inimical to personal rights and public
welfare" may not be preserved under the freedoms of association.' 8
A state, however, absent any important public interest to protect,
may not compel the disclosure of membership lists of organizations
engaging only in the dissemination of ideas. 19
Citing historical instances in both England and the United States
in which pamphlets written anonymously because of fear of reprisal
had played an important role in the progress of mankind, 20 the Court
held that the requirement of identification of persons responsible for
2
the hand-bills was indeed a restriction on the freedom of expression. '
The Court found an analogy in the cases of NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson2 and Bates v. City of Little Rock,2 in which the
anonymity of members of groups engaged in the dissemination of
ideas was protected. The majority of the Court held here that since
the ordinance was a restriction on the distribution of hand-bills in
24
general, it was unconstitutional under the Court's former decisions
15. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
16. Id. at 625-26.
17. See State v. Freeman, 143 Kan. 315, 55 P.2d 362 (1936). The dissent
in the principal case points out the fact that statutes prohibiting the anonymous distribution of materials relating to elections are found in thirty-six
states. 362 U.S. at 70 n. 2.
18. New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) (Ku Klux
Klan).
19. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The
rationale of the Court was that the freedom of expression of the organization's members would be curtailed for fear of reprisal if such lists were
made public.
Judge Swain, in the lower court report of the principal case remarked
that in regard to the seeming conflict between the last two cited cases:
"The distinction which Mr. Justice Harlan draws between the two seems to
be that the members of N. A. A. C. P. are good guys and the members of
Ku Klux Klan are wicked men." 332 P.2d at 452.
20. 362 U.S. at 64-65.
21. "There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would
tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of
expression." Id. at 64.
22. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
23. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).

24. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.

19601

RECENT CASES

invalidating ordinances not specifically directed to the protection of
the public interests which the state may regulate. The Court therefore held that the ordinance was void on its face, rejecting any contention that the ordinance was justified under the state's power to
prevent fraud, false advertising or libel since neither on the face
of the ordinance nor in its legislative history could be found any
intent to limit its effect to such acts. 25 The dissent protested that the
petitioner showed no harm to himself caused by the ordinance,26 that
the court was creating a "freedom of anonymity," 27 and that the
interests of the public in preventing fraud, false advertising and
libel, absent any injury to the petitioner, justified the ordinance. 28
The old conflict between the exercise of the power of the state to
pass laws for the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare
and the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms rears its problem-generating head in this case. Though the majority here disregarded all
evidence that the ordinance was directed at libel, false advertising or
fraud, the dissent found from the facts that such was the intent of the
ordinance. 29 The fact, however, that the petitioner was guilty of
none of these acts and yet is in court demonstrates clearly that the
practical effect of the ordinance is broader than its theoretical basis
as determined by the dissent. Perhaps the dissenters were attempting
to answer this objection when they stated that the ordinance should
be considered constitutional in view of the presumption of its validity
so long as the petitioner showed no harm to himself.30 But is not this
presumption counterbalanced by the fact that liberty of speech and
press are "preferred freedoms" 31 entitled to such a high degree of
protection that they may be restricted only in situations where a
"clear and present" danger 32 to the public can only be prevented by
such a restriction? At any rate, is not the requirement that a person
be identified with his expression in itself a substantial restriction on
freedom of speech and press, and therefore harmful to petitioner? It
is obvious that in a great many situations people will speak anonymously that which they would dare not utter if their identity were
known. One has only to look back into history to see that anonymous
pamphlets have played an important role in the formation of the
political ideas and principles of both the United States and Great
25. 362 U.S. at 64.
26. Id. at 69.

27. Id. at 70.
28. Id. at 69-70.
29. Id. at 68.
30. Id. at 68-70.
31. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). "[T]he usual presumption
supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our
scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms seciued by the
First Amendment." Id. at 529-30.
32. See note 7 supra.
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Britain. The FederalistPapers of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay,33 the
letters and hand-bills of Thomas Paine,34 and the even now anonymous Letters to Junius35 are graphic examples of the value of handbills written anonymously. Assuming that the ordinance is indeed a
restriction on freedom of expression, is such a restriction necessary
to prevent a "clear and present" danger to the state? It is not, because libel, false advertising and fraud are already subject to criminal
penalties,36 and it is difficult to see how such an ordinance as this
would help prevent them; for a person who is anonymously practicing
fraud, false advertising or criminal libel will not comply with this
33. These papers not only had much to do with the eventual adoption of
our then infant Constitution, but they have also been called "the best
commentary on the principles of government which has ever been written."
5 WRnIGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 52 (Ford ed. 1895).

34. For discussion of these works of Thomas Paine see BLEYER, HISTORY OF

ICAwN JOURNAmsm 90-93 (1927).
35. For discussion of these writings see BLEYER, op. cit. supra note 34, at
23, 79.
36. Query: Is the sole basis for the restriction on freedom of expression by
criminal penalties found in the "clear and present danger" doctrine? This
question is suggested by the absence of the phrase from both majority and
dissenting opinions. Holmes' formulation of the doctrine would allow the
restriction of words which create a "clear and present danger . . . (of]
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). (Emphasis added.) Since the doctrine
has been extended to the limiting of state control of freedom of expression,
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 536 (1945), it would appear that the state,
to paraphrase Holmes' words, has a right to prevent words which lead to
"the substantive evils that the states have a right to prevent." It would
seem, however, that the doctrine is thought by some to be applicable only
to evils which undermine the very existence of the state. It was said, in
Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357, 378 (1927), that "the fact that speech

AM

is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough
to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury
to the State." But if this is so, then on what basis do the penalties against
fraud, false advertising and libel stand? Perhaps it is possible that they too
can be explained in terms of the doctrine of "clear and present danger,"
though this is not at all clear. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940),
would put the destruction of life or property, the invasion of the right of
privacy, and breach of peace within the "clear and present danger" doctrine.
Justice Black, in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949), says that "the
basic premise of the First Amendment is that all present instruments of
communication, as well as others that inventive genius may bring into being, shall be free from governmental censorship or prohibition," and implies
that the "clear and present danger" test should be applied to all laws
restricting freedom of expression. See the discussion in BEANS, FREEDOM,
VIRTUE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 56, 67 (1957). In Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952), however, Frankfurter stated that "libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is
unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues
behind the phrase 'clear and present danger.'" (Emphasis added.) Frankfurter, it seems, would base the criminal penalty for libel (and perhaps also
fraud and false advertising) on some basis other than the "clear and present
danger" doctrine. Such speech, he would say, simply does not fall within the
area of constitutional protection. Therefore, in such a case "clear and present
danger" and other like doctrines are irrelevant. This attitude should be
compared with that of Mr. Justice Reed's dissent in Beauharnais. At best, the
precise rationale of the Court as to the basis of state power re fraud, false
advertising and libel is hidden behind a cloud of nebulous decisions, a
cloud which can only be removed by future decisions.
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ordinance at the risk of being subjected to greater criminal penalties.
This ordinance therefore merely increases the penalty on persons
convicted of such acts; an increase which, if necessary, could be added
to the existing penalties for such crimes without restricting the
freedois of speech and press as this ordinance does. Schneider v.
State,37 which set forth the criteria that in cases such as this the
Court should carefully examine the effect of challenged legislation
and appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in its favor,
was apparently applied by both the majority and the dissent in
arriving at their conclusions. The majority discussed at length the
effect of such a regulation on the freedoms of speech and press, and
found that the restrictions it imposes were not outweighed by any
substantial reasons advanced in favor of the ordinance. The dissent,
on the other hand, would have the ordinance stand until some actual
restriction of the freedom of expression occurred. But from an overall
reading of the Schneider case it would seem that the burden is upon
the proponents of the offending ordinance to prove its necessity.
Therefore the holding of the majority is not only more reasonable
than the dissent from a common sense point of view, but is also more
in line with precedent.

CONTRACTS-TERMINATION-EMPLOYMENT FOR INDEFINITE
DURATION NOT TERMINABLE FOR REFUSAL OF EMPLOYEE
TO COMMIT PERJURY
Plaintiff, employed under a contract for an indefinite period of
time, brought an action for wrongful discharge against his employer,
alleging that said discharge resulted from his refusal to obey his
employer's instructions to commit perjury.1 The lower court gave
37. "In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgement of the rights
is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters
of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal
activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of
rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases
arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in
support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights." 308 U.S.
147, 161 (1939).

1. One Matula, acting for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
hired the plaintiff to be a business agent for the union, making the employment for an indefinite period of-time. The plaintiff subsequently was subpoenaed to testify before the Assembly Interim Committee on Governmental
Efficiency and Economy of the California legislature. Matula, it is alleged,
ordered plaintiff to make false statements before the committee and discharged him upon learning that truthful answers had been given to all
questions asked of him by the committee.
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judgment for the defendant on the pleadings. 2 On appeal to the
district court of appeals, held, reversed. Even when an employment
is for an indefinite duration, the discharge of an employee for refusing
to commit perjury is contrary to public policy and, therefore, wrongful. Petermann v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 24 (1959).
At common law in England, the hiring of a person for an indefinite
period of time gave rise to a presumption that the employment was
for one year.3 In the United States, however, this rule was never
popular. 4 Our courts attempt to arrive at the intent of the contracting parties; and it is apparently reasoned that an employment
contract would stipulate a definite term if the parties intended to be
bound for any certain length of time and that, without such a provision in the contract, the intent was evidently to create an employment capable of termination at the will of either party.5 The rule is
not without exceptions, but departures from the doctrine have occurred almost solely 6 in cases that involve additional factors which
the court regarded as indications that the intent was not actually
to create an indefinite term of employment. One recurring exception is that the rule does not apply when some consideration other
than a promise to perform services is given by the employee in
return for employment.7 Another exception has sometimes been made
2. "[T]he allegations in plaintiff's complaint must be taken as true, and
so taken the question is whether a cause of action has been stated," Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 24,
26 (1959), citing Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 275, 239 P.2d
630, 631 (1952).

3. 1

LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT

504 (1913)

and cases there cited.

4. Id. at 519.
5. This reasoning was made by the Supreme Court of Alabama as early
as 1891 in the case of Howard v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry., 91 Ala. 268, 8
So. 868 (1891). In that case the court recognized the general rule applied
in the law of contracts that "when a contract does not specify a particular
time within which it is to be performed, the presumption is the parties
intended performance within a reasonable time." 8 So. at 868. But in holding the contract for employment terminable at will, the court noted that the
above mentioned general rule of contract law "applies to contracts in which
the duties to be performed are such as may be completed within a reasonable
time ...
but where a person's services are engaged . . . the rule does not
apply. It is a mere matter of employment of services for the purposes
specified, and . . . unless some time is fixed during which the employment
is to continue, either party may terminate the contract at will." 8 So. at 869.
6. Some early cases held that an employment for an indefinite duration was
presumed to be for a reasonable time "and that the contract is broken if
the employee is discharged without good cause." Brown v. National Elec.
Works, 168 Cal. 336, 143 Pac. 606, 607 (1914) and cases there cited. But
the Brown case involved additional consideration for employment and has
since been cited with cases in that category discussed in note 7 infra. See
Thacker v. American Foundry, 98 Cal. App. 2d 76, 177 P.2d 322, 327 (1947).
7. Weber v. Perry, 201 S.C. 8, 21 S.E.2d 193 (1942) (employee gave up
position in Michigan to take South Carolina job); Dutch Maid Bakeries, Inc.
v. Schleicher, 58 Wyo. 374, 131 P.2d 630 (1942). But see Shagerberg v.
Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936); Orsini v. Trojan Steel
Corp., 219 S.C. 272, 64 S.E.2d 878 (1951).
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when a weekly or monthly salary has been agreed upon and incorporated into an employment contract that otherwise states no
definite duration. In such a case, some courts have held that the
employment may be terminated only at the end of the proper unit
period. 8 The general rule is also subject, of course, to statutory
limitations such as those imposed by the National Labor Relations
Act, which forbids the discharge of an employee because of union
activity or affiliation. 9 Notable among state statutory limitations are
a provision that forbids discharge because of an employee's affilia10
tion with "the military forces of the state"' and one that makes it
wrongful to discharge an employee for the sole reason that the latter
absents himself from work in order to serve as an election official."
However, in the absence of statutory limitations and with the exceptions above noted, it has been well established in America that
an employment for an indefinite duration is terminable at will by
1
either party, no matter what the cause.
In the instant case, the court clearly departs from and indirectly
denounces this doctrine.' 3 The generally unlimited right, says the
8. Harrosh v. Fife Bros. Health Ass'n, 1 So. 2d 323 (La. Ct. App. 1941);
Holland v. State, 29 Ala. App. 181, 194 So. 412 (1940). But see American
Nat'1 Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 12 Tenn. App. 305, 308 (M.S. 1930), where the
Tennessee court held that "the fact that a hiring is at so much per day, week,
month, quarter, or year, raises no presumption that the hiring was for such
a period, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve."
(Emphasis added.)
9. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization or (4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an
employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter. . . ." 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1958).
10. IOWA CODE ANN. § 29.5 (1949). This statute declares a specific punishment for violation of any of its provisions. Violation of the statute, then,
gives rise to a criminal action; but whether an employee can also recover
personal damages in a civil action for wrongful discharge under this type
of statute is apparently open to doubt and often answered in the negative.
See Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956).
11. CAL. ELECTION CODE § 695.
12. Mitchell v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 184 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1950);
Gambrel v. United Mine Workers of America, 249 S.W.2d 158 (Ky. 1952);
Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956). In the Mitchell case,
however, the court implied that public policy might, in some situations, limit
the application of the general rule.
Some states have adopted the general rule in statutory form. CAL. LABOR
CODE § 2922. A Georgia statute codifies the general rule, but in addition
creates a presumption that when wages are payable at a stipulated period
the employment is for such period. GA. CODE ANN. § 66-101 (1935).
13. The employment was actually stated to be for as long as the plaintiff's work was satisfactory, but such an employment is considered employment for an indefinite duration, and the same general rules are usually
applied. E.g., Savage v. Spur Distrib. Co., 33 Tenn. App. 27, 228 S.W.2d 122
(M.S. 1949); Wright v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 141 W. Va. 368,
90 S.E.2d 459 (1955). It is reasoned that, under such a contract, an employer's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with an employee's work is a completely subjective thing that can be determined only by the employer himself, and a court cannot look into the reasonableness of the employer's

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL." 14

court, "may be limited ... by considerations of public policy."'1 4 The
California legislature has clearly pronounced the policy of the state
against perjury; 15 and in order to prevent serious impairment of
that policy, an employer may and must be denied his rights to discharge an employee, even though the relationship is for an unspecified duration, if the sole reason for discharge is a refusal on
the part of the employee to commit the crime of perjury. 6 It is
reasoned that to uphold such a dismissal as being within the rights
of the employer would be to defeat the purpose of the state statutes
against perjury and would, therefore, tend "to encourage criminal
conduct upon the part of both the employee and employer."?
The opinion is a novel one in this field 18 and appears to be a definite
extension of judicial control over the rights of an employer to discharge an employee under a contract terminable at will. Considered
in the light of the specific circumstances of the case, this decision
seems just. But accepted concepts would be threatened if this
doctrine were carried to an extreme. For example, can it be said
that public policy demands that an employer show good cause for
any dismissal, even though the employment contract be terminable
at will? Such an extension of the doctrine would impair long esdissatisfaction: Crillo v. Curtola, 91 Cal. App. 2d 263, 204 P.2d 941, 946 (1949);
Edwards v. Doherty, 74 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1954). See Annot., 6 A.L.R. 1497
(1920). However, the general rule that no action for wrongful discharge
arises under such a contract is subject to the important exception that the

employer's dissatisfaction must be real and not contrived; the contract must
have been terminated because the employer, whether with reason or not,
was actually dissatisfied. "[W]here there is evidence tending to show that the
discharge was due to reasons other than dissatisfaction with the services
the question is one for the jury." Coats v. General Motors Corp., 3 Cal.
App. 2d 340, 39 P.2d 838, 841 (1934); accord, American Music Stores v.
Kussel, 232 Fed. 306 (6th Cir. 1916); Fried v. Portis Bros. Hat Co., 41 Ga.
App. 30, 152 S.E. 151 (1930).
In the instant case, the court recognizes the applicability of this doctrine
but mentions it just briefly in the opinion as a sort of added "crutch" for
allowing recovery to this particular employee. 344 P.2d 28. Throughout most
of the opinion, the court treats the employment as the usual one for an
indefinite duration and makes it clear that it would reach the same decision even if the element of satisfactory work were lacking in the case.
14. 344 P.2d at 27.
15. CAL. PEN. CODE § 118 makes perjury a crime, and § 653 (f) makes it
a crime to solicit the commission of perjury.
16. 344 P.2d at 27.
17. Ibid.
18. It is true that the court in Mitchell v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 184
F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1950) refers to public welfare; but the reference is
at most an implication that considerations of public welfare might have some
effect upon the general doctrine. The argument is, of course, far from
novel in the general field of contract law. In the first place, the order to
commit perjury in the instant case, if "accepted" by the employee and if
considered from the standpoint of contract law, would have been an illegal
bargain. "A bargain may be illegal because the performance that is bargained for is illegal ..
"
CORBIN, CONTRACTS 1154 (1952). Furthermore,
"in thousands of cases contracts have been declared to be illegal on the
ground that they are contrary to public policy. . . ." Id. at 1160.
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tablished rights of the American employer who chooses to hire under
contracts terminable at will and would place upon him a burden
that should be borne by the employee.19 But if the holding of this
case is limited to cases involving a clear contravention of legislative
or public policy, then a reasonable and quite desirable progressive
step will have been taken. There remains, however, the difficult
problem of defining the term "public policy" as used in this decision.
Does it mean only expressions of the legislature of a state policy
against the employer's activities leading to the employee's discharge? 20 Or will the rule be extended to apply to cases in which
the employee has been discharged because he exercised rights which,
though not specifically protected by statute, should, in the opinion
of the court, be protected in the interest of the public? 21 It is obvious that such an expansion of the rule would allow much greater
chance for extreme extensions of the doctrine. It may be, however,
that fear of the courts' over-extension of the doctrine is unfounded.
Considering the strong stand that has been taken in the United States
in favor of the "terminable at will" doctrine, it might be said that an
employer's right to discharge an employee who has been hired for
an indefinite duration is itself supported by public policy. In any
event, it is probable that the courts will be hesitant to extend-or
22
perhaps even to recognize-the doctrine set down in the instant case.
19. But see AARON, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION AND THE LAW 806-09 (1957),
where the "sufficient cause" doctrine adopted by many foreign countries is
discussed. For example, when an employee is employed for an indefinite
period, the German Works Council Act of February 4, 1920 provides "for the
right of an employee to file objections with the Works Council if he was
discharged for no stated reason or where the discharge-not warranted by
economics or technical conditions affecting the plant-would subject him
to an inequitable hardship." Id. at 807.
20. Under this rule the doctrine would be applicable to such a case as
Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956), where an employee
was discharged because he filed a claim for workman's compensation.

"Constitutions and statutes are declarations of public policy by bodies of men

ahithorized to legislate. It is the function of the courts to interpret and
apply these, so far as they go and so far as they are understandable. Some
judges have thought that they must look solely to constitutions and statutes
and to earlier decisions interpreting and applying them as the sources from
which they may determine what public policy requires. This is far from
true, even though these are the sources that are first to be considered and
that often may be conclusive." CORBIN, CONTRACTS 1164 (1952).
21. If this extension of the rule is followed, it is possible that the doctrine
might be made to apply to cases in which an employee was discharged be-

cause he brought a civil action against a fellow employee (as in Mitchell v.
Stanolind Pipe Line Co., supra note 12), or, to an even greater extreme,
where the employee was dismissed when he remained away from work

because of illness (as in Gambrel v. United Mine Workers of America,

supra note 12).
22. An indication of this can be seen in the decision of the court in the
recent California case, Mallard v. Boring, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (Dist. Ct. App.
1960), where an employee was discharged because she had agreed to serve
as a trial juror. Although the court agreed that the services of a trial
juror were important and ought to be encouraged, neither the instant case
nor public policy was ever mentioned; and, since the employment was for
an indefinite duration, the elements of wrongful discharge were found lacking.
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EVIDENCE-FEDERAL COURTS-EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY
STATE OFFICERS THROUGH UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE INADMISSIBLE IN FEDERAL COURTS
Defendant, indicted for violation of a federal criminal statute,
moved the district court to suppress evidence obtained by state
officers through an allegedly unreasonable search and seizure. The
court denied the motion because the defendant presented no evidence
that any federal officer participated in the search and seizure. The
court of appeals affirmed. On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held,
reversed. Evidence obtained by state officers during a search which
would have violated defendant's immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the fourth amendment had it been conducted by federal officers is inadmissible though no federal officers
participated. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
In 1914, in Weeks v. United States,' a unanimous Supreme Court
held inadmissible in a federal court evidence obtained by federal
officers through an unreasonable search and seizure.2 This decision
established a rule for enforcing the fourth amendment against misconduct on the part of the federal government and its agencies.3 The
effective coverage of the rule was expanded during the Prohibition
Era, so that the slightest participation of a federal agent, under
color of his office, in a search by state officers would bring the evidence secured within the rule,4 and evidence obtained by state officers
acting alone would be excluded if the single purpose of their action
was enforcement of a federal law.5 So long as the rule was applied
to evidence tainted by a hint of federal oppression, the Court stood
1. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. 232 U.S. at 398. The leading case on exclusion before Weeks was Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). A statute was held to transgress the
fourth and fifth amendments because it empowered a court to presume the
incriminatory nature of private papers if a party refused to produce them in
response to a court order. The opinion contains an interesting discussion of
the background of the fourth amendment in England. The decision was
narrowly construed. E.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (fifth amendment
does not apply to a corporation); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904)
(private papers found under search warrant admitted). There is a line of cases
which develop the applicability of the fifth amendment provision against selfincrimination. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928) (dissenting
opinion); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Gouled
v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
4. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) (state police invited federal
officer to come along).
5. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
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unanimous.6 Two cases were decided on the same day in 1949, however, which raised doubts as to the status of the exclusionary rule.
7
One, Wolf v. Colorado,
held that the Constitution does not require
that evidence be excluded in state courts because obtained by an
unreasonable search and seizure; the other, Lustig v. United States,8
expressly reserved the question whether evidence seized by state
officers acting alone was admissible in federal prosecutions.9 In spite
of the questions raised by the Wolf and Lustig decisions, the federal
courts with one exception' 0 had refused to exclude evidence obtained
by state officers in federal prosecutions." Commentators had noticed
the potential impact of Wolf and Lustig, however, 12 and abolition of
13
the "silver platter" doctrine had been frequently suggested.
The holding of the principal case enlarges the federal exclusionary
rule so that evidence obtained by state officers is subjected to exactly
the same standards as evidence obtained by federal officers. The
court must consider whether, if the state officers making the search
had been federal officers, the evidence would have been admissible;
if not, it must be excluded. 14 There is no co6rdination with state
practice, but rather a "federal 'right' of privacy"' 5 is recognized by
the Court, which neatly displaces the "silver platter" doctrine in
16
federal criminal law. The majority opinion cites Wolf v. Colorado
as authority for applying the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained
solely by state officers,
6. In a 1949 case, the court split five-to-four in a decision which reaffirmed

the doctrine of Byars v. United States, supra note 4. Lustig v. United States,
338 U.S. 74 (1949). Commentators have called the rule artificial and unduly
restrictive. E.g., Parsons, State-Federal Crossfire in Search and Seizure and
Self Incrimination,42 CORNELL L.Q. 346 (1957).

7. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
8. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
9. This opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter is the source of the term often
used to describe the old rule-the "silver platter" doctrine. "[I]t is not a
search by a federal officer if evidence secured by state authorities is turned
over to the federal authorities on a silver platter." 338 U.S. at 79.
10. Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
11. The cases are collected in an article by Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten

Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MiNN. L.
REV. 1083, 1139 n.201, 1141 n.203 (1954).

12. See, e.g., Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism and the
Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1, 14-16, 20-24 (1950); Galler, The Exclusion
of Illegal State Evidence in Federal Courts, 49 J. CRin. L., C. & P.S. 455

(1959); Kamisar, supra note 11, at 1129-45; Kohn, Admissibility in Federal
WASH. U.L.Q. 229,
239-44, 256-60 (1959); Note 27 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 392, 395 (1959).
13. Galler, supra note 12, at 460; Kamisar, supra note 11, at 1144-45; Parsons,
supra note 6, at 362-68; Note, 51 COLum. L. REV. 128, 130 (1951); Note, 6
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 703, 706-07 (1959).
14. The majority were convinced that this rule would be much easier to
apply than the "federal intent" test, established in Gambino v. United States,
275 U.S. 310 (1927), which the various circuits had applied to evidence
acquired by state officers with great inconsistency. 364 U.S. at 212.
15. The phrase is borrowed from Allen, supra note 12, at 9.
16. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
Court of Evidence Illegally Seized by State Officers, 1959
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for there it was unequivocally determined by a unanimous Court that
the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers .... [N]o distinction can logically be drawn between evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment and that obtained in violation of the Fourteenth. 17
The Court further considers the new rule to be necessary as part of
its supervisory jurisdiction over the federal courts.18 It states four
basic policies behind this decision: (1) The only effective sanction
against ruthless methods of law enforcement is exclusion of the
evidence, and the effect of this sanction must not be diluted by permitting any evidence so obtained to be used in federal courts.19 (2)
In a state which has its own exclusionary rule, the federal court will
support state policy by excluding evidence obtained by unreasonable
search and seizure by state officers. 20 (3) Wholesome federal and
state law enforcement cooperation will be encouraged if federal
agents are not allowed to use evidence obtained illegally by state
officers. 21 (4) The integrity of the federal court system should be
maintained free of pollution by unscrupulous law enforcement practices, for "no distinction can be made between the government as
22
prosecutor and the government as judge."
The principal case abolishes a rule forged almost fifty years ago,
which has been tempered by fires of criticism and hammers of
judicial opinion into a firm, workable doctrine. For authority, the
Court relies upon Wolf v. Colorado,2 but that case did not hold that
the federal constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
by state officers. That opinion merely stated that an arbitrary in17. 364 U.S. at 213-15.
18. Id. at 216.
19. Id. at 216-21. The Court admits that little empirical evidence is available, but asserts that the movement toward the exclusionary rule is seemingly
"inexorable." Most of the states have some form of the rule. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation has found it practical, as has California, where the
rule was established by a state supreme court decision. People v. Cahan, 44
Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
20. 364 U.S. at 221. On the other hand, the federal court does not intrude
upon federal-state relations by refusing to accept evidence admissible in
.state courts. The state may adopt whatever sanctions are necessary to control
its own officers in enforcement of its own laws. Cf. Rea v. United States, 350
U.S. 214 (1956) (federal agents enjoined from presenting evidence in state
court).
21. 364 U.S. at 221-22. Unlawful conduct by state officers will be discouraged to the extent that such conduct is directed to obtaining evidence for
federal officers pursuant to a secret agreement which the defendant cannot
prove.
22. Id. at 222-23, quoting Mr. Justice Holmes in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928). The federal system must keep the highest of
Constitutional standards, and not be an accomplice to wilful disobedience of
the law. This idea is based on Holmes' "dirty business" doctrine in the Olinstead case, and might logically exclude even evidence illegally obtained by
private citizens. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
23. 364 U.S. at 213.
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trusion of privacy by the police might be a denial of due process per
se.24 From a policy standpoint, the majority says the "silver platter"
doctrine was hard to apply, thereby resulting in inconsistent decisions
on the question of federal participation in searches and seizures by
state officers. 25 This uncertain proposition is the only practical reason
for the present holding. The net effect of the new admissibility test
is to relieve federal courts of the task of finding whether federal
officers participated in a search and seizure by state officers. The
danger that federal agents will secretly use the services of the less
restricted state police is thereby obviated. Surely this is the evil at
which the Court was aiming, though it avoids saying so. 26 Rather,
the Court justifies the new rule as part of its supervision over the
"administration of criminal justice in the federal courts, ' 27 and ignores the traditional foundation of the exclusionary rule-control
over the conduct of law enforcement officers out of court.28 Knowledge
that evidence found would be inadmissible in federal court cannot
influence officers seeking state convictions. The attempt to reconcile
the state and federal policy conflict is inadequate, for though some
evidence inadmissible in state courts will now be excluded in federal
courts also, state policy may still be denied federal support, because
29
state standards may be higher than the constitutional minimum.
Furthermore, a finding of fact by a state court as to the reasonableness
of the search is irrelevant in a federal court which is required to make
an independent inquiry. 30 If the "silver platter" doctrine is to be
abandoned, it would be more logical to adopt a rule coordinated with
state practice, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggests, 3' so that federal
courts could support state policy as to admissibility.32 Since Wolf
v. Colorado, there is no other basis upon which federal courts can
control state officers enforcing state laws. But in view of Justice
24. The clear import" of Justice Frankfurter's language is made obvious by
consideration of his opinion in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and
his dissent in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). See also Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the principal case. 364 U.S. at 233, 237-38.
25. 364 U.S. at 212.
26. The problem is approached indirectly by asserting the need for "forthright cooperation under constitutional standards." 364 U.S. at 221-22.

27. 364 U.S. at 216.
28. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S.
95 (1927); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465 (1921); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Cf. Rea v.
United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943).
29. See for instance, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's discussion of Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), the blood test case, in his dissent to the principal
case. 364 U.S. at 246.

30. 364 U.S. at 223-24.
31. 364 U.S. at 249-51.
32. But see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1927)
Constitution violated, court has no discretion to exclude evidence).

(unless
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Frankfurter's explanation of his own opinion in that case, it seems
that there is really no authority for abandoning the "silver platter"
doctrine. 33

JUDGMENTS-LIMITATION OF OVERRULING DECISION TO
PARTIES BEFORE THE COURT AND TO CAUSES OF ACTION
ARISING IN THE FUTURE
Plaintiff' brought suit against the Kaneland Community School
District for injuries sustained when the school bus in which he was
riding left the road, allegedly as a result of the driver's negligence.
Plaintiff's complaint contained no allegations of the existence of insurance,2 but instead asked the court to abolish in toto the established
Illinois rule of school district tort immunity.3 Defendant's motion to
dismiss on grounds of tort immunity was sustained by the trial court
and judgment was entered in its favor. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Illinois, held, reversed and remanded, 4 but the effect of the
decision limited to this plaintiff and to causes of action arising in
the future. When undue hardship will result to parties who have
relied on prior decisions, it is within the inherent power of a court
to limit the application of an overruling decision to the parties
presently before the court and to cases arising out of future occurrences. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d
89 (Ill. 1959).
33. 364 U.S. at 251 (dissent of Harlan, Clark, and Whittaker, JJ.).

1. Plaintiff was one of eighteen students who were passengers on defend-

ant's school bus when the accident occurred. Most of the students were
burned and injured. The Molitor family alone had four children injured as
a result of the accident and was claiming damages totaling $991,000. Chicago
Daily Tribune, Dec. 17, 1959, part 1, p. 14, col. 2.
2. The defendant school district actually carried public liability insurance
with limits of $20,000 for each person injured and $100,000 for each occurrence. Under the decision in Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consol.
School Dist., 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952), defendant's insuror
would have been estopped from relying on the tort immunity of school
districts as a defense.
3. The sovereign immunity doctrine in regard to towns and counties was
established in Illinois in 1870. Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346

(1870). In 1898 tort immunity was extended to school districts. Kinnare v.

City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 N.E. 536 (1898).
4. The court decided that "the rule of school district tort immunity is
unjust, unsupported by any valid reason, and has no rightful place in
modern day society." Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 163
N.E.2d 89, 96 (Ill. 1959). The tort immunity aspect of the holding is discussed in Note, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 588 (1959); 31 Miss. L.J. 313 (1960); 38
T.ExAs L. REV. 649 (1960). However, the subject matter of this article is
limited to the unique manner in which the decision is to take effect.
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The orthodox rule is that a judicial decision overruling an established precedent is given retroactive effect.5 Retroactivity is a
result of the declaratory or Blackstonian theory of law that the
previous decision was not merely bad law, but that it never was the
law.6 When a court which adheres strictly to the declaratory theory
overrules a precedent established by previous decisions of the same
court, a unique problem arises in relation to parties who relied on the
prior decisions which are now declared never to have been the law.
Some courts and many writers have considered the hardships resulting from retrospective application of an overruling decision to be
intolerable.7 As a result most courts have established an exception
to the general rule of retroactivity to the effect that vested contract 8
and property 9 rights which have been acquired in reliance on the
overruled precedent will not be disturbed by the overruling decision.
5. "[I]t cannot be true that a case can be overruled and at the same time
be held to be the law of the state in which it was rendered." Storrie v.
Cortes, 90 Tex. 283, 38 S.W. 154, 155 (1896). See Swanson v. Swanson, 212
Ark. 439, 206 S.W.2d 169 (1947); Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950).

6. "[Tlhe subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to

vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the
former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such
a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law; that is, that it is not the
established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined."
BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs 36 (4th ed. Chase 1938).

7. See, e.g., CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 147 (1921).
8. Probably the first cases recognizing an exception to the general rule of
retroactivity were the municipal bond cases. These cases involved a change
in judicial decision in regard to the constitutional power of a legislature to
enact a law authorizing a bond issue. In regard to the contract rights of the
parties which had been acquired prior to the overruling decision, the court
in Douglas v. County of Pike stated that "we recognize fully, not only the
right of a State court, but its duty to change its decisions whenever, in its
judgment, the necessity arises. It may do this for new reasons, or because
of a change of opinion in respect to old ones; and ordinarily we will follow
them, except so far as they affect rights vested before the change was
made." 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1879); accord, Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863). Both the Douglas and Gelpcke cases seemed to
be based upon the constitutional provision against the impairment of contract, but it now appears that that provision applies only to legislative
action and not to judicial action. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444
(1924); Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895). However, in similar
municipal bond cases the state courts have generally recognized the contract
exception. Payne v. City of Covington, 276 Ky. 380, 123 S.W.2d 1045 (1938);
Gentzler v. Smith, 320 Mich. 394, 31 N.W.2d 668 (1948).
Rights acquired under a life insurance contract have also been protected
from retroactive operation of a decision changing the construction of a
clause in the contract. World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tapp, 279 Ky. 423, 130
S.W.2d 848 (1939); see Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 296 Ky. 815, 177
S.W.2d 588 (1943).
9. In the interest of stability, after property rights have vested in accordance with a previous decision, a court will usually deny retrospective application to an overruling decision. Haskett v. Maxey, 134 Ind. 182, 33 N.E.
358 (1893); Hanks v. McDanell, 307 Ky. 243, 210 S.W.2d 784 (1948) (application of "biting rule" to construction of wills). In giving only prospective
application to the decision in Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10 So.
635 (1892), the court stated that "this early decision has become a rule of
property, and to hold otherwise now would upset a great many legal titles."
10 So. at 638.
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The same exception usually applies to overruling decisions affecting
criminal law10 and the rights of public officers." At first it was believed that this exception applied only to decisions overruling a
previous construction of a statute or constitutional provision, but
there is authority for the proposition that the exception also applies
to judicial decisions in regard to the common law.12 Although many
of the courts speak of the vesting of rights, the primary factors
common to all of the decisions which limit the effect of their decree
to prospective operation appear to be (1) a justifiable reliance and
(2) an undue hardship resulting from such reliance. 13 In the case
of Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. 14 the question
was raised as to whether a decision limited to prospective operation
would violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Cardozo clearly stated the rule to be that "a state in defining
the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself
between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward."15
10. In the field of criminal law the courts apply their decisions prospectively

or retrospectively with the view of preserving the highly valued concept of
human liberty. "The punishment of an act declared by the highest court
of the state to be innocent, because the same court had seen fit to reverse

its interpretation of a statute, would be the very refinement of cruelty. ..."
State v. Longino, 109 Miss. 125, 67 So. 902, 903 (1915); accord, State v. O'Neil,
147 Iowa 513, 126 N.W. 454 (1910) (prospective operation given to a decision
changing the construction of a criminal statute); State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623,
107 P.2d 324 (1940) (prospective application given to an overruling decision
as to what constitutes a lottery). But see Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642
(D.C. Cir. 1941) (writ of habeas corpus denied even though construction of
statute under which accused was convicted had been altered by a later
decision).
11. Many courts hold that the rule that an unconstitutional law is a
nullity cannot be applied to work a hardship and impose a liability on a
public officer who in the performance of his duties has acted in good faith
in reliance on a statute later declared unconstitutional. To require a public
officer to determine the constitutionality of a statute at his own risk would
delay the efficient operation of government. See Fergus v. Brady, 277 Ill.
272, 115 N.E. 393 (1917); Golden v. Thompson, 194 Miss. 241, 11 So.2d 906
(1943); Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P.2d 242 (1943).
12. "Distinctions in this connection have been drawn between such definite
legislation and the common law because of the dogma that the courts only
declare what such law is and has been at all times. But there should be no
distinction, for the ideal ought not be permitted to destroy the practical

or the actuality." World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tapp, 279 Ky. 423, 130

S.W.2d 848, 852 (1939); accord, Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 296 Ky. 815,
177 S.W.2d 588 (1943). See Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287
U.S. 358 (1932); Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10 So. 635 (1892);
Hanks v. McDanell, 307 Ky. 243, 210 S.W.2d 784 (1948); Phillips Exeter
Academy v. Gleason, 157 A.2d 769 (N.H. 1960). But see Carter Oil Co. v.
Weil, 209 Ark. 653, 192 S.W.2d 215 (1946) wherein it was stated that "no one
can be said to have acquired a vested right to have the benefit of an erroneous decision." 192 S.W.2d at 218.

13. German Gymnastic Ass'n v. City of Louisville, 306 Ky. 810, 209 S.W.2d

75 (1948); Philips Exeter Academy v. Gleason, supra note 12. See Terracciona
v. Magee, 148 A.2d 68 (N.J. Super. 1959); Nickoll v. Racine Cloak & Suit Co.,
194 Wis. 298, 216 N.W. 502 (1927). But see Peerless Elec. Co. v. Bowers,
164 Ohio St. 209, 129 N.E.2d 467 (1955).
14. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
15. 287 U.S. at 364.
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The Molitor 16 decision is an extension of the Sunburst doctrine. It
differs from that case in that in Molitor the plaintiff was given the
benefit of the overruling decision whereas the Sunburst decision was
limited entirely to prospective operation.'7 The prospective application of the Sunburst case has been criticized for two reasons 8 First,
a completely prospective application offers little incentive to a plaintiff to commence an action in an effort to change the law when he
will not receive the fruits of his labor. And second, since the overruled law is applied to the case before the court, the statement by
the court to the effect that a new law will be applied in the future
amounts to mere dictum. The Molitor decision is evidently an attempt to reconcile the criticism of the Sunburst case by rewarding
the plaintiff for commencing an action which eliminated an outmoded
precedent, and by simultaneously reducing the resulting hardships
to the school districts which had relied on the previous decisions.
There is authority for the proposition of rendering a prospective decision and also allowing the immediate plaintiff to recover. In support
of this proposition the court cited seven cases. 19 However, in none
of the cases cited by the court were there several potential plaintiffs
who were injured simultaneously. It is submitted that in this aspect
the Molitor case is unique. The court has held that Thomas Molitor,
the plaintiff, can recover. But the court has also indicated that the
other students who were injured simultaneously with Thomas Molitor
20
cannot recover.
There are distinct advantages to both prospective and retrospective
overruling. Therefore, a court should not adopt a mechanical rule but
should consider all factors in attempting to achieve an equitable balance.2 1 In the instant case there are three ways in which the court
16. 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959).

17. In comparing the two cases Justice Davis dissenting in Molitor, stated
that "the principle announced by the court is an aborted offspring of the
Sunburst theory." 163 N.E.2d at 104 (dissent).

18. See 47 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (1934). For an extensive listing of law review articles concerning the Sunburst case, see 13 MoNT. L. REv. 74 n. 15
(1952).
19. Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Shioutakon v.
District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Farrior v. New England Mortgage
Sec. Co., 92 Ala. 176, 9 So. 532 (1891); Haskett v. Maxey, 134 Ind. 182, 33 N.B.
358 (1893); Barker v. St. Louis, 340 Mo. 986, 104 S.W.2d 371 (1937); Dauchey
Co. v. Farney, 105 Misc. 470, 173 N.Y. Supp. 530 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
20. "For this reason we feel justice will best be served by holding that,
except as to the plaintiff in the instant case, the rule herein established shall
apply only to cases arising out of future occurrences." 163 N.E.2d at 97. Of
course the court's decision is only a prediction that it will so hold in the
future. In the event that another student who was injured in the same
accident should bring an action, it cannot be categorically stated that he
will be denied recovery, although the court has so indicated.
21. In determining the effect of an overruling decision a court should consider that "law is not a pure science, that law loses its vital meaning if it
is not correlated to the organic society in which it lives, that law is a
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could have approached the question as to how to apply its decision.
First, under the doctrine of stare decisis a precedent is not overruled unless it appears to be clearly erroneous in the light of present
conditions. Therefore if the court decides to overrule an established
precedent, it theoretically follows that the parties were not justified in
relying on the previous decision.2 Even under stare decisis a judicial
decision is binding as between the parties but only a prediction as to
how the court will decide in the future.23 If later conditions and policy
indicate that the prediction is erroneous, a reliance on that prediction
is not justified. This actually appears to be the better reasoned
rule as it tends to insure stability of judicial decisions. Second, if
in an exceptional case the court decides that there has been a justified
reliance upon an outmoded precedent,2 it could apply the previous decision to the present litigants and predict that a new law will
be applied to cases arising in the future. Admittedly this amounts to
dictum, but it does constitute a judicial warning as to the future.
Third, assuming that the court finds a justified reliance but nonetheless feels obligated to reward the plaintiff for bringing the action, it
could apply the "new law" to the parties before the court and to cases
arising out of future occurrences and predict that it will apply the
"old law" to causes of action which have arisen prior to the date
of the overruling decision. This result has disadvantages to both the
present defendant and to future plaintiffs. The "new law" is applied
to the present defendant even though his reliance was as justified as
that of future potential defendants who will escape liability. Likewise, the present plaintiff will be allowed to recover and future
plaintiffs who have.had an identical right invaded prior to the date
of the overruling decision will be denied recovery merely because
present and prospective force, that law needs some stability of administration
. .. that people will rely upon and adjust their behavior in accordance with
all the law be it legislative or judicial or both. These considerations should
guide the lawmakers and the law appliers in making their determinations
in respect of whether a change in the law is to be effective only for the
future or also for the past, and if the latter, to what extent." Warring v.
Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1941).

22. "If that decision was ever the law, then this court should not have
overruled it, either upon principle or policy, because, if it was sound as a
matter of law, the court had no authority to change it, and, if it was the law
as to contracts made and rights accruing under it, then it would be just as
good law, for all time to come, to other, persons who might contract with
reference thereto." Storrie v. Cortes, 90 Tex. 283, 38 S.W. 154, 158 (1896).

23. Morgan, -Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L.

Rv.467, 477 (1957).

24. In the Molitor case the court believed that most school districts had
relied on tort immunity, and as a result, were not insured. However, the fact
that 'the defendant was insured might indicate that it had not relied on the
doctrine of tort immunity. See Terracciona v. Magee, 148 'A.2d 68 (N.J.
Sugier. 1959), wherein it was held that the reliance of a YMCA on the
doctrine of' charitable immunity was not justified when it appeared that the
doctrine had been under attack for several years..

1960]

RECENT CASES

they were not the first to reach the ear of the judiciary. Although
there are instances in which such a procedure may be desirable, it
certainly seems to give an arbitrary cast to the law.25 In the Molitor
case the students who were injured at the same time and in the same
accident as Thomas-Molitor might very well question why a different
law should be applied to them, a law which in effect has been overruled.26

LABOR LAW-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTSAVAILABILITY OF BREACH OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSE AS SET-OFF
IN ACTION FOR BREACH BY EMPLOYER OF AGREEMENT TO
CONTRIBUTE TO EMPLOYEE WELFARE FUND
Plaintiffs, trustees of a welfare fund created by The National
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, sought recovery of royalty
payments, which defendant-employer allegedly owed the fund under
a collective bargaining agreement with the union.1 The employer
defended on the ground that he was released from his duty to pay
royalties into the welfare fund when the union breached its promise
not to strike. The employer also filed a cross-claim against the union
for damages occasioned by the union's breach of the collective bargaining agreement. The lower court gave judgment for the trustees
against the employer and for the employer against the union with
25. Compare Spruill, The Effect of an Overruling Decision, 18 N.C.L. REv.
199 (1940) with Carpenter, Court Decisions and the Common Law, 17 COLUm.
L. REv. 593 (1917). In the former it was stated that "some writers have suggested that courts after handing down an overruling decision should decline
to give it retroactive effect to the prejudice of litigants subsequently coming
before it. They would, however, give the overruling decision retroactive
effect as to the parties involved. This is held necessary to get rid of'an objectionable rule, 'but once rid of the rule there is no call for the sacrifice
of more victims upon the altar of reform.' This discloses a difficult problem.
If the new rule be announced by a judicial decision, rather than by means
of dicta, the decision will generally apply it retroactively to the prejudice
of someone. And if the first party is prejudiced, it seems hard later to judge
another by a more favorable rule. To do so seems to give the law such an
arbitrary cast that it is difficult to think that such a rule, regularly applied,
would meet with approval." 18 N.C.L. REv. at 220.
26. Assuming that another student who was injured in the same accident
should bring an action against the school district and the court's prediction
in the Molitor case to the effect that such a student could not recover was
enacted into law, it could conceivably be argued that there has been a denial
of equal protection of the laws. However, it is generally held that "the
equal protection clause of the federal Constitution, does not assure uniformity
of judicial decisions." Peerless Elec. Co. v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 209, 129
N.E.2d 467 (1955).
1. The welfare fund meets the requirements of the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), § 302(c) (5), 61 -Stat. 156 (1947)-, 29 U.S.C.
§ 186 (1958) which allows an employer to pay moneys into a, trust fund for
the benefit of employees.
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the direction, in effect, that the employer's judgment against the
union be set off against the trustees' recovery. On' certiorari to the
Supreme Court, held, reversed. An employer's damages for a union's
breach of a collective bargaining agreement cannot be set-off against
recovery by trustees of the welfare fund for employer's breach of
the same agreement. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459
(1960).
In interpreting bilateral contracts the courts, since the eighteenth
century, have sought to make mutual promises either dependent or
concurrent. 2 The result of this development in construing conditions
as dependent or concurrent best protects the interest of each party
to the contract. 3 This is not to say that parties to a contract cannot
make promises independent; and if the court finds that the intention
of the parties, as embodied in the contract, is that the promises be
independent, this intention will be given effect.4 The right of a thirdparty beneficiary to sue on a contract has been established since the
case of Lawrence v. Fox.5 The rights of the third-party beneficiary,
however, are subject to all the defenses and equities arising out of
the contract. 6 One of the defenses available to the promisor is the
right of set-off, and the few times that it has been claimed against
third-party beneficiaries it has been allowed.7 But where federal
questions are concerned, as in the principal case, federal courts are
not bound to follow the applicable state law and may look to pertinent statutes or to the federal common law for a solution to the
problem. 8 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Textile Workers Union
2. 3 WILUSTON, CONTRACTS § 816 (1936).
3. World's Fair Mining Co. v. Powers, 12 Ariz. 285, 100 Pac. 957 (1909),
afd 224 U.S. 173 (1912); see also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 267 (1932),
and Acme Pest Control Co. v. Youngman, 216 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948) where the court said the presumption is that all stipulations in a contract are dependent. But see Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co.,
59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del. 1945) which involves a lease and the court said that
where a lease was involved there would be a presumption in favor of construing the promises as independent.
4. The law does not protect against conditions, harsh though they may
be, which a party to a contract has voluntarily imposed on himself. Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 836 (D. Minn. 1946), aff'd, 188 F.2d
277 (8th Cir., 1951); see also Knox v. Knox, 337 Mich. 109, 59 N.W.2d 108
(1953).
5. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
6. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 140 (1932): "Present or prospective
failure of the promisee to perform a return promise which was the consideration for the promisor's promise, the rights of a donee beneficiary or creditor
beneficiary under the contract is subject to the same limitations." See also
McLean Constr. Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 168 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
7. Cf. Fulmer v. Goldfarb, 171 Tenn. 218, 101 S.W.2d 1108 (1937); Greene
v. McDonald, 75 Vt. 93, 53 Atl. 332 (1902). See also 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §
819 (1951) who would allow the promisor to set off his claim against the
third-party beneficiary because it may "be regarded as just."
8. Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). For a
complete discussion on the federal common law see MOORE, COMMENTARY,
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of America v. Lincoln Mills9 clearly indicated the development of a
body of federal substantive law governing collective bargaining
agreements.' 0 In developing this federal law the courts will look
to congressional intent as embodied in the applicable federal statutes." But state law will, if compatible with national labor policy,
be looked to in finding the rule that will reach the desired result.12
In the principal case the Court concluded that in view of the circumstances surrounding the collective bargaining agreement, contract law is simply not applicable. The Court then, without expressly
saying so, turned to these circumstances and interpreted the agreement in light of the national labor policy. The Court said that the
defendant has a continuing interest in the welfare fund, which
includes more than the mere payment of royalties, because he has
assumed equal responsibility with the union for its safe management
and its existence is a product of both union and management.' 3 The
Court also said that if the defendant and other employers were
allowed to set off damage claims against the welfare fund, that fund
would suffer and there would be pressure to increase the royalty
payments so that the welfare fund could continue to meet its obligations. 14 Furthermore, if the set-off were allowed its effect would be
to subject the employees, the beneficiaries of the fund, to damage
claims against the union which would conflict with the national labor
policy.15 The Court's rejection of the attempted set-off, and conse340-356 (1949) and 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.318 (1959).
9. 353 U.S. 448 (1957), 11 VxD. L. REv. 243 (1957). In J.T. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) there was some discussion as to whether contract
law was applicable to collective bargaining agreements. Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking for the Court in Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), said that § 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) established only
procedural rights. Therefore, it would appear that the Lincoln Mills case
has weakened the effect of the Westinghouse case.
10. "We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301
(a) (of Taft-Hartley] is federal law, which the courts must fashion from
the policy of the national labor laws." Id. at 456.
11. Ibid.
12. Cf. Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939); United
States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903). See generally MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE pt. 3 (1939).
13. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), supra note 1, provides for the establishment of a welfare trust fund and regulates the use
of the fund.
14. The obligations of the welfare trust fund are as follows: "[Flor the
purposes of paying either from principal or income or both, for the benefit
of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or hospital care,
pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or
illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of
the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and
sickness insurance, or accident insurance." Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act) § 302(c) (5), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1958).
15. The Court relies on § 301(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act which provides:
"Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of
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quently the rejection of the applicability of contract law to collective
bargaining agreements, has the effect of establishing the welfare fund
16
as a distinct and separate entity.
This effect clearly enhances the national labor policy.'7 With the
welfare fund separated from the vicissitudes of management-union
relationships the welfare fund can better serve its intended purpose
of providing the employee with some measure of financial and social
security. Therefore, the Court's protection of the welfare fund at
the expense of some established contract principles 18 is desirable.
The Court seems to be following its decision in Lincoln Mills19 to
formulate a substantive law to apply to collective bargaining agreements. 2o

LABOR LAW-WAGES-CONSTRUCTION OF A FACILITY
DESTINED TO SUPPLY ONLY PART OF ITS SERVICES TO
INDUSTRIES PRODUCING FOR INTERSTATE COMMERCE NOT
COVERED BY FLSA
In a suit brought by the Secretary of Labor in a United States
District Court in Texas, defendant construction contractor was enjoined from violation of section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act
the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization. as an
entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets."
16. For a more comprehensive treatment of the Taft-Hartley welfare fund
as a separate entity see Note, The Taft-Hartley Welfare and Pension TrustAn Emerging Legal Entity, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1181 (1960); Sanders & Bowman,
Labor Law and Workmens Compensation-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND.
L. REV. 1159 (1960).

17. The recent passage of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act,
72 Stat. 997 (1958), 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1958), that will protect the welfare
fund from abuse of either union or management, further supports the conclusion that Congress intended the welfare fund to be free of exclusive
control by either union or management.
18. Whether contract principles should apply to collective bargaining agreements has provoked a great deal of controversy. The most persuasive advocate for applying contract principles is Archibald Cox, Royall Professor of
Law, Harvard Law School. For a complete discussion of Mr. Cox's views see
Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, U. MIxcH. 11T
SUMMER INST.: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE LAW 107 (1958). For discussion of those supporting the conclusion reached by the Court in the principal
case see Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAnv. L.

REv. 999 (1955) and Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration, 2
BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1952).
19. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 9.
20. Quaere: Would this Court have reached the same conclusion if the

collective bargaining agreement had not included multiple promisors but

had included only one employer?
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which requires time-and-a-half for overtime.' The construction in
question was a dam which would greatly expand impounding facilities by replacing an existing structure. The dam would serve no
navigational purpose, but from 40 to 50 per cent of its water would
be consumed by industrial users in the production of goods for interstate commerce.2 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 3 holding that the workers were involved in neither the production of
goods-water-for commerce nor an activity "closely related" or "directly essential" to production of goods for comerce. On certiorari
to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed. Construction of a new facility, which when completed would supply only part
of its services to industries producing for interstate commerce, is not
an activity sufficiently "closely related" to the focal point of coverage
-- "commerce"-to be covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Mitchell v. H. B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310 (1960).
Coverage of employees under the FLSA is determined by the activity of the individual employee.4 A worker must be engaged "in
commerce" in the sense of "trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States ... ,,5 or "in the
production of goods for commerce," defined as "produced, manufactured, mined, handled, or in any other way worked on .... ,,6 An
additional category of coverage was created by defining production
to include "any closely related process or occupation directly essential to production . . . . 7 Presumably, the underlying problem in
applying these elastic terms in the questionable area of related activities is separating the national interest in achieving the social
purposes of the act from purely local interests purposely left to state
supervision. 8 Construction work is a particularly difficult type of
related activity. Without statutory guidelines as to the necessary
1. 63 Stat. 912 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1958), amending 52 Stat. 1060

(1938).

2. The dam was located on the lower Nueces River and was designed to
serve Corpus Christi, Texas. It increased the reservoir capacity roughly
ten-fold and inundated the existing dam.
3. 262 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1959).

4. Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Associates, 358 U.S. 207 (1959); Mc-

Leod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943); Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co.,

317 U.S. 564 (1943); A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942);
29 C.F.R. § 776.2 (Supp. 1960).
5. 63 Stat. 911 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 203 (b) (1958).

6.63 Stat. 911 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 203 (j)(1958).
7. Ibid. Prior to the 1949 amendments, employees were covered if their
activity was only "necessary" to the production of goods for commerce. 52
Stat. 1061 (1938).
8. A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942). Congress has
not exerted its full constitutional power in this act. As originally passed
by the House, coverage would extend to employees whose activity "affected"
commerce. H.R. REP. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 29 (1938). See 10 East
40th St. Bldg. Co. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945); 29 C.F.R. § 776.1 (Supp.

1960).
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relationship to "commerce," the courts have required the activities
of construction workers to be an integral part of the movement of
goods or of the channel of transmission across state lines before
granting them coverage as being "in commerce." Where the construction is vital to the continued operation of an existing instrumentality of commerce, such as repair of railroad bridges or the
maintenance of interstate roads, 10 the workers have been considered
to be "in commerce." Construction of new facilities not yet dedicated
to use in commerce, e.g., the building of a new interstate highway,"
were denied coverage in the early FLSA decisions, which followed
cases interpreting the Federal Employers Liability Act. 12 But in
Mitchell v. Vollmer & Co.'3 the Supreme Court rejected the "new
construction" rule as a decisive criterion for workers building a new
lock in an interstate waterway, adopting as an alternate test "whether
the work is so directly and vitally related to the functioning of an
instrumentality or facility of interstate commerce as to be, in practical effect, a part of it .... 14
For construction projects in the area of production for commerce,
the courts have had the statutory definition of related activities to
apply. Each phrase of the definition---"closely related," "directly
essential," "production," ''goods,' ''for commerce"'-has engendered
litigation, but the majority of cases have turned on the degree of
relationship of the activity to some productive process. To be covered
prior to the 1949 amendments, employees' work had to have "such a
close and immediate tie with the process of production for commerce . . . [as to be] an essential part of it . . . ,"15 As in the "in
commerce" area, construction work that repaired, expanded or replaced existing, functioning facilities of production, such as a manufacturing plant 16 or a metropolitan waterworks system supplying
industries, 7 was covered, while the "new construction" of such
facilities was held not to be "closely related."' 8
9. J. F. Fitzgerald Co. v. Pedersen, 324 U.S. 720 (1945).
10. Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943).
11. Van Klaveren v. Killian-House Co., 210 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1954); Moss
v. Gillioz Constr. Co., 206 F.2d 819 (10th Cir. 1953).
12. Murphy v. Reed, 335 U.S. 865 (1948); Kelly v. Ford, Bacon & Davis,
Inc., 162 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1947). The "new construction" test came from
Raymond v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 243 U.S. 43 (1917) and New York
Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) interpreting the Federal Employers
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958).
13. 349 U.S. 427 (1955).
14. Id. at 429.
15. A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 525 (1942). Although
adopted prior to the 1949 amendments when the statutory requirement of
relationship was "necessary" to production of goods for commerce, the rule
is not inconsistent with the new terms of the amended statute.
16. Walling v. McCrady Constr. Co., 156 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1946).
17. Mitchell v. S. A. Healy Co., 37 CCH Lab. Cas. U 65,576 (D. Ill. 1959).
18. Kelly v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc., supra note 12; Mitchell v. Tune,
178 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Ark. 1959).
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In the instant case, the Vollmer decision is followed and "new
construction" rejected as a decisive negative test in any area of
FLSA coverage. 19 The Court, however, found in the 1949 amendments to the act a legislative intent to restrict coverage in the fringe
area of activities related to production. 20 Re-analysis of the act indicates that "the focus of coverage became 'commerce,' not in the
broadest constitutional sense, but in the limited sense . . . of the
From this it follows that "production for commerce"
statute....,'21
is not of equal significance as a category of coverage but was included only because of the effect it has on "commerce." Activities not
"in production" but only "related to production," e.g., the operation
and maintenance of this dam when completed, are one step further
removed from the center of coverage but may still be sufficiently
closely related to "commerce" to be within the act. "What is finally
controlling in each case is the relationship of the employment to
'commerce' . . 22 and while the new construction of an interstate
waterway lock may be sufficiently closely related to "commerce" to
be "in commerce," the same sort of new construction of a manufacturing plant, although equally closely related to production, is
not equally related to "commerce," and therefore, less likely to be
within the scope of the act. The construction in question here is not
of a facility of production but of a facility only ancillary to production and is so remote from "commerce" as to be outside the ambit of
the act.2 The absence of any exclusive or primary dedication of
this dam when completed to aiding production emphasizes the lack
of a close relationship of the construction to "production for commerce." 24 The alternative argument of the Secretary, that construction of the dam was itself production of goods-water-received
short treatment. Assuming that such work might be construed as
production, the absence of dedication would make it local production
even though some small part of the water became incorporated into
25
other goods shipped in commerce.
The result of this holding is somewhat contradictory. Eliminating
19. 362 U.S. at 313.

20. For a detailed analysis of the legislative intent of the 1949 amend-

ments see Sanders, Basic Coverage of the Amended Federal Wage and Hour

Law, 3 VAND. L. RaV. 175 (1950).
21. 362 U.S. at 316.
22. Id. at 320.
23. The dissent, comparing Vollmer with the present case, believed "there
is no more remoteness here than there. It is difficult to understand why a
stringent test of remoteness is used in determining whether construction
work is related to 'production of goods for commerce' when a liberal test
was applied in the Vollmer case in holding that such work was 'in commerce.'" Id. at 324. The dissent felt also that this was not truly new construction but was essentially the expansion of an existing facility.
24. Id. at 320, 321.

25. Id. at 321.
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the automatic exclusion of "new construction" may subject many

building projects to coverage which formerly have been thought to be
outside the act. Recognizing the distinction between new construction
and maintenance, considering the dedication of a project, and measuring the relationship needed to satisfy the "close and immediate
tie" test from "commerce" rather than from "production for commerce" all indicate a more restrictive interpretation of the act. The
area left unsettled by this case is the construction of new production
facilities such as manufacturing plants, 26 and the construction of new
ancillary facilities entirely dedicated to aiding production.27 In these
areas, it seems likely that the more restrictive view of "closely related" will produce much the same results as the "new construction"
rule formerly did. Tests of FLSA coverage, however, are more imprecise than before. The Court has retreated from an area which, on
the basis of prior decisions, it could well have reached; but the area
given up is small while the potential for further advances is increased.

PROCEDURE-STANDING-LAWFUL PRESENCE ON
ILLEGALLY SEARCHED PREMISES AS SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED THEREON
Defendant was found on certain premises where federal officers,
in executing a search warrant, discovered and seized illegal narcotics.
He was indicted for violation of two provisions of the federal narcotics
laws,' under either of which proof of possession itself would permit
26. Kelly v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc., supra note 12, denied coverage
for workers constructing a new manufacturing plant. The reasoning of
the instant case will probably reach the same result for new plants just
beginning a production process. Where the new construction when completed becomes an integral part of an existing plant which has been producing for commerce, the Court will probably find sufficient relationship
to justify coverage. The difficult problem will be a new plant built in a
different geographic area from existing plants but which essentially is
simply an expansion of a functioning production process. Mitchell v. Tune,
178 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Ark. 1959) considers a problem of this sort. Under
the Zachry rationale, such a case could go either way.
27. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949)
gave coverage to the operating and maintenance personnel of an irrigation
system which was entirely dedicated to aiding farmers to produce for
interstate commerce. The Zachry opinion distinguished this case on a basis
of lack of exclusive dedication but implied that even if the dam had been
wholly dedicated to aiding production its construction would still be too
remote for coverage.
1. "It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase, sell, dispense, or
distribute narcotic drugs except in the original stamped package or from

the original stamped package; and the absence of appropriate tax paid
stamps from narcotic drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of
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conviction. Acknowledging merely that he was on the premises with
the consent of the owner, defendant moved to suppress the evidence
of the seized narcotics on the grounds that the search and seizUre was
unlawful. The government challenged the defendant's standing to
make the motion, contending that he had failed to allege sufficient
interest in the narcotics or in the premises searched. The district
court denied the motion, holding defendant had not qualified as a
"person aggrieved, ' 2 and the court of appeals affirmed. On certiorari
to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. One who
is lawfully present on premises which are being unlawfully searched
has sufficient standing to move that the evidence thereby obtained be
suppressed, without alleging any interest therein, when such evidence
is sought to be used against him. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960).
The exclusion of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search
and seizure is a means of enforcing the constitutional privilege 3 of
the right of privacy. 4 For this reason, the evidence is admissible unless the defendant establishes that his right of privacy has been unlawfully invaded.5 The lower federal courts have held almost
unanimously 6 that such invasion is sufficiently shown where the dethis subsection by the person in whose possession the same may be found."
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4704(a).
"Wherever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown

to have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall

be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant
explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury." Narcotic Drugs
Import and Export Act § 2(c), 35 Stat. 614 (1909), as amended, 21 U.S.C.
§ 174 (1958).
2. "A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the
district court for the district in which the property was seized for the
return of the property and to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was illegally seized without
warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient on its face, or (3) the property
seized is not that described in the warrant, or (4) there was not probable
cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was
issued, or (5) the warrant was illegally executed." FED. R. CRnvr. P. 41(e).
(Emphasis added.)
3. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. McCoRImcK, EVIDENcE §§ 137-39 (1954).

At common law it was almost

universally accepted that the illegality of the means by which evidence was
procured did not affect its admissibility. The exclusionary rule was established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), where it was held
to be prejudicial error to admit as evidence papers seized by a federal
officer without a warrant in violation of the fourth amendment.
5. Id. § 139.
6. See, e.g.: 1st Circuit: United States v. De Bousi, 32 F.2d 902 (D. Mass.
1929); 2d Circuit: United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631
(2d Cir. 1946); 3d Circuit: Zimmerman v. Wilson, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir.
1939); 4th Circuit: Grainger v. United States, 158 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1946);
5th Circuit: Lovette v. United States, 230 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1956); 6th
Circuit: MacDaniel v. United States, 294 Fed. 769 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
264 U.S. 593 (1924); 7th Circuit: United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 361 (7th
Cir. 1951); 8th Circuit: McMillan v. United States, 26 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1928);
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fendant is an "owner of the property or premises, '7 "a lessee or
licensee,"' or one with "dominion or control." 9 On the other hand,
where the defendant claims no property right in the goods seized, 10 or
is a "guest"'" without any legal interest in the premises, the courts
have held the interest to be too tenuous to confer standings. Despite
the implications raised by Jeffers v. United States,'2 however, the
:Supreme Court had not determined the interest necessary to maintain
.amotion to suppress evidence prior to the instant case.13
Here the Court recognized the dilemma 14 with which the defendant
was confronted in establishing the requisite interest in the seized
;articles or in the premises searched. Under the indictment a conviction could be obtained merely upon proof that the narcotics were
in his possession. Thus, in order to show the interest in the seized
articles required by the prevailing view, it would have been necessary
for defendant to allege facts, which if proven, would have established
his guilt. Moreover, the government was permitted to take advantage
,of contradictory positions in obtaining defendant's conviction. The
narcotics were admitted as evidence on the ground that defendant
,did not have possession, yet the conviction was based upon the very
fact that they were in his possession. The Court regarded such con9th Circuit: Ingram v. United States, 113 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1940); 10th Circuit:
McShann v. United States, 38 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1930); D.C. Circuit: Gibson
v. United States, 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, sub noma. O'Kelley v.
United States, 326 U.S. 724 (1945).
7. MacDaniel v. United States, supra note 6.
'8. United States v. De Bousi, supra note 6.
9. Grainger v. United States, supra note 6; McMillan v. United States,
supranote 6.
10. Goldberg v. United States, 297 Fed. 98 (5th Cir. 1924).
11. Gaskins v. United States, 218 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Gibson v.
United States, supra note 6.
12. 342 U.S. 48 (1951). Federal officers without a search warrant, entered an apartment belonging to defendant's aunt, and seized illegal narcotics which he had hidden therein. Federal statutes provided that no
property rights could exist in such goods and made the same subject to
forfeiture as contraband. The Court upheld defendant's standing to move
that the evidence be suppressed, on the ground that Congress in abrogating
the property rights merely intended to aid in their forfeiture and did not
deprive defendant of his property rights for purposes of the exclusionary rule.
13. In Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942), the Court held
that a federal wire-tapping statute should not be interpreted as forbidding
the use of wire-tap evidence against one not a party to the conversation, in
view of the well-established rule in the lower courts that only one whose
constitutional rights have been violated could object to the introduction of
illegally acquired evidence. However, the Court was careful to point out
that it did not decide that the rule as applied in the lower courts was correct.
14. "The dilemma that has thus been created for defendants in cases like
this has been pointedly put by Judge Learned Hand: 'Men may wince at
admitting that they were the owners, or in possession, of contraband property; may wish at once to secure the remedies of a possessor, and avoid the
perils of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they come as victims,
'they must take on that role, with enough detail to cast them without question. The petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament; but they were
obliged to choose one horn of the dilemma.' Connolly v. Medalie, 2 Cir., 58
F.2d 629, 630." 362 U.S. at 262.
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tradictory "assertions of power by the Government"'15 as being inconsistent with the fair administration of criminal justice. It concluded
that since the indictment charged possession, defendant had sufficient
standing to challenge the legality of the seizure without alleging
any interest in the seized articles. In addition, defendant had sufficient.
standing to contest the search of the premises. Although a showing of
interest in the premises would not necessarily have revealed an ele-ment of guilt, defendant would have been placed in a position requiring an explanation of the interest. However, the Court held that.
the property right need not be as extensive as that of a "licensee,"'
"guest," or "lessee." Emphasizing that it was dealing with constitutional safeguards, the Court pointed out that such private property
concepts have become tenuous in modern law. Justice Frankfurter,.
speaking for a unanimous Court on this point, declared untenable the.
position heretofore apparently well-established in the lower courts,.
and held that defendant's presence on the searched premises with the
consent of the owner was a sufficient interest to qualify him as a
party aggrieved by the search.
The extension of protection afforded by the exclusionary rule 6
against unreasonable searches and seizures seems justifiable in the
instant case. It may be objected that under this holding, the defendant is permitted to take contradictory positions in regard to his:
interest in the seized articles. However, this result is of less importance than the protection of individual constitutional rights. The
removal of private property concepts as a determinative of sufficient
interest in the premises is an additional step in furthering the objective of the exclusion in view of the technical rules which surround
these concepts.
15. 362 U.S. at 264.
16. For a criticism of the exclusionary rule see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§

2183-84 (3d ed. 1940).
CORNELIUS, SEARCH AN

Principal arguments for the rule are noted in 2

SEIZURE §§ 8, 9 (2d ed. 1930).
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TORTS-EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE-INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION BY OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT AS BASIS FOR
CAUSE OF ACTION
In an action to recover damages for humiliation and emotional
distress, plaintiff alleged that defendant telephoned her several times
requesting that she meet him for the purpose of illicit intercourse, and
mailed to her obscene photographs of himself.' On motion to dismiss for insufficiency, held, for plaintiff. The solicitation of illicit
intercourse in conjunction with the mailing of obscene photographs
is conduct sufficiently outrageous to constitute a cause of action for
emotional distress. Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc. 2d 106, 179 N.Y.S.2d
689 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
Although it has been stated that mental distress is not compensable,2 damages have traditionally been awarded for mental suffering
in cases where an independent tort provides the basis of liability.3
While some courts continue to require the existence of an independent
tort,4 other courts, motivated by the exigencies of the situation, have
allowed recovery for willfully inflicted mental disturbance resulting
in physical injury. 5 Except in a group of cases imposing special
1. The defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty, of attempting to
show obscene photographs in violation of N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1141. Mitran v.
Williamson, 21 Misc. 2d 106, 179 N.Y.S.2d 689, 690 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
2. In Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861),
Lord Wensleydale said: "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and

does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes

that alone...."
3. Assault: Kline v. Kline, 158 Ind. 602, 64 N.E. 9 (1902); Bennet v.
Fleser, 225 Mich. 224, 196 N.W. 438 (1923); Trogden v. Terry, 172 N.C. 540,
90 S.E. 583 (1916). Battery: Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn.

369, 42 Atl. 67 (1899); Williams v. Underhill, 63 App. Div. 223, 71 N.Y.
Supp. 291 (1901); Carmody v. Trianon Co., 7 Wash. 2d 246, 109 P.2d 560
(1941). False imprisonment: Standard Oil Co. v. Humphries, 209 Ala. 493, 96
So. 629 (1923); Fisher v. Rumler, 239 Mich. 224, 214 N.W. 310

(1927);

Chicago, R.I. & G. Ry. v. Neubert, 248 S.W. 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).

Seduction: Tillotson v. Currin, 176 N.C. 479, 97 S.E. 395 (1918); Middleton
v. Nichols, 62 N.J.L. 636, 43 Atl. 575 (1899). Technical trespass to land:

Lyons v. Smith, 176 Ark. 728, 3 S.W.2d 982 (1928); Bouillon v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 148 Mo. App. 462, 129 S.W. 401 (1910).
In cases involving negligent torts, as distinguished from intentional torts,
the courts have allowed recovery for mental suffering as an incident to

physical injury. For a discussion of this development in the field of negligent
torts see generally PROSSER, TORTS § 37 (1955).
4. See, e.g., Ex Parte Hammett, 259 Ala. 240, 66 So. 2d 600 (1953); Bartlow
v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948); Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 151
Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
5. The leading case is Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57, in which
the plaintiff suffered nervous shock and resulting physical injuries because
the plaintiff told her, as a practical joke, that her husband had been seriously
injured in an accident. See also Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men,
105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md.
189, 153 Atl. 22 (1931); Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814

(1926).
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liability upon common carriers and other public utilities,6 the interest in freedom from emotional and mental distress not resulting
in physical harm has only recently been accorded independent legal
protection.7 Thus far, such protection has been given only in those
situations in which the actor's conduct has been extreme or outrageous.8 Such conduct has been found to exist in the following
situations: high-pressure methods of collection agencies and creditors,9
practical jokes of an unusually cruel nature, 10 and abuse of authority
in a flagrant manner." Undoubtedly, situations will continue to arise
in which conduct might be classified as outrageous; therefore, a
definition of the limits of this new basis of liability must await future
court decisions.
To establish the insufficiency of the complaint in the instant case,
the defendant contended that the mere solicitation of illicit intercourse is not actionable. 12 The court rejected this contention because,
6. The reasons for imposition of liability in these situations are discussed
in Wade, Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REV. 63, 66 (1950);
see also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 48 (Supp. 1948), and cases there cited.
7. Two of the early cases to recognize an independent interest in freedom
from severe emotional distress are Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa
1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932), in which the court awarded damages for mental
suffering from the threatening letters sent by a collection agency, and La
Salle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1924), in
which the court allowed recovery for mental distress resulting from threats
to sue by a creditor. In 1948, section 46 of the Restatement of Torts was
revised to provide liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Subsequently, a number of courts have relied on this section of the
Restatement in allowing recovery for emotional distress. Cohen v. Lion
Prods. Co., 177 F. Supp. 486 (D. Mass. 1959) (charges by employer that
plaintiff had not performed his work satisfactorily); Savage v. Boies, 77
Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954) (false story told plaintiff by police to persuade
her to confess); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 28 Cal. 2d 330,
240 P.2d 282 (1952) (threats of physical violence for failure to pay fee by
members of mutual protective association); Curnett v. Wolf, 244 Iowa 683,
57 N.W.2d 915 (1953) (threats of injury to plaintiff's reputation by a former
employer). Other courts have recognized RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (Supp.
1948) as stating the applicable law but have denied recovery on other
grounds. United States v. Hambleton, 185 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1950) (interview
of woman for unreasonable time in an unreasonable manner); Slocum v.
Food Fair Stores, 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958) (insults by store employee to
customer); Browning v. Slenderella System, 341 P.2d 859 (Wash. 1959)
(refusal to serve Negro). Other courts have recognized the new tort of
emotional distress without relying on the Restatement. E.g., Delta Fin. Co.
v. Ganakas, 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S.E.2d 383 (1956) (threats to arrest a child in
attempting to repossess a television set).
8. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 40, 43 (1956).
9. Delta Fin. Co. v. Ganakas, 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S.E.2d 383 (1956); Barnett
v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932); La Salle Extension
Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934),
10. Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57; Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 -La.
735, 84 So. 37 (1920); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153
Atl. 22 (1931).
11. Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954); Johnson v. Sampson,
167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926).
12. The defendant cited Prince v. Ridge, 32 Misc. 666, 66 N.Y. Supp. 454
(1900), in arguing that emotional distress must be accompanied by physical
injury in order to be compensable.
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in addition to the solicitation, "there is alleged in the complaint the
sending to the plaintiff of a photograph of the defendant with his
private parts exposed."' 13 The court thus characterized this situation
as one in which the actor's conduct might be considered outrageous
and followed section 46 of the 1948 supplement to the Restatement of
Torts, which provides that: "One, who, without a privilege to do so,
intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable
(a) for such emotional distress and (b) for bodily harm resulting
from it.' 14 The court also pointed out that emotional distress resulting from intentional or wilful conduct, as distinguished from
negligent conduct, is actionable without an accompanying physical
15
injury.
For several years the legal writers have advocated the recognition
of the intentional infliction of mental distress alone as a separate
and distinct tort, 6 and the American Law Institute has recently
adopted this view in its Restatement of Torts.17 By holding the defendant liable without attempting to find an independent tort of
assault or invasion of the right of privacy, this court placed New
York in the growing number of states which recognize the new tort
of emotional distress. To allow recovery, the courts have required the
actor's conduct to be outrageous, that is, beyond all bounds of decency. 18 In the instant case, the conclusion that the defendant's
conduct was outrageous is inescapable; if, on the other hand, the
defendant's conduct had consisted only of solicitation of illicit intercourse, the court might have dismissed the action on the ground that
such conduct is not sufficiently outrageous to assure the genuineness
of the mental injury. 19 This case indicates a trend toward a full
consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the solicitation
rather than the disposal of the case by mechanical rules of thumb.
13. 197 N.Y.S.2d at 690.

14. Id. at 691. See note 7 supra.
15. Ibid. The court distinguished the well known case of Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) as applying only to negligent
torts as contrasted to wilful torts and relied on Beck v. Libraro, 220 App.
Div. 547, 221 N.Y. Supp. 737 (1927) to support its position. The court also
commented on the fact that there seems to be a movement away from the
rule that emotional distress negligently caused and unaccompanied by physical injury is not actionable. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y. 2d 16, 176 N.Y.S.2d
996 N.E. (1958) (dictum).

16. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbances as Legal Damage, 20 iCn. L. Rsv.
497 (1922); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1936); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental
Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MicH. L. REv. 874 (1939).
17. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948); see note 7 supra.
18. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAin. L. REv. 40, 43 (1956).
19. It is generally recognized that the solicitation of illicit intercourse does
not by itself give rise to a cause of action. As Judge Magruder has so
cogently phrased it, "there is no harm in asking." Magruder, Mental and
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1033, 1055
(1939); see also Reed v. Maley, 115 Ky. 816, 74 S.W. 1079 (1903).
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When the full consideration of those circumstances produces the conviction that the defendant's conduct has been extreme or outrageous,
the plaintiff will have a basis for redress.

TORTS-LIABILITY OF INVITEE FOR NEGLIGENTLY
MAINTAINED CONDITION ON ADJACENT PREMISES
Plaintiff, a guest in an automobile parked on defendant's lot, while
returning to the lot via an adjacent lot, not owned, maintained, or
controlled by defendant, fell over a bumper-block. Although separate
entrances were available, the two lots gave the appearance of one
large singly-owned lot as they were surrounded -with a uniform
fence and separated only by a white line painted on the asphalt.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on
the theory that defendant was not liable for injury due to hazards
on premises over which it had no control. On appeal, held, reversed
and remanded. Where an invitor has reason to know that the invitee
believes adjacent premises to be the property of the invitor, the
invitor's liability extends to negligently maintained conditions on the
adjacent premises. Chapman v. Parking, Inc., 329 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959).
As a general rule liability to an invitee1 for injuries sustained by a
negligently maintained condition on the property depends upon control and possession rather than ownership of the premises.2 It would
seem that this control must be extensive enough to give the occupant
the right to admit or exclude people,3 and that potential liability
1. There is considerable difference of opinion among the courts as to what
constitutes an invitee. See 2 HARPER & JAwas, TORTS § 27.12 (1956); James, Tort

Liability of Occupier of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63

YALE

L.J. 605 (1954); Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573
(1942). Some courts have required that the business of -the invitee be pecuniary in nature and of some economic benefit to the owner. The development
of these cases is traced in Prosser, supra at 576-85. This view was strongly
advocated by Bohlen in his article, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in
the Law of Tort, 53 U. PA. L. REV. 209 (1905). It was perhaps Professor
Bohlen's influence more than anything else that prompted the adoption of
the economic benefit test by the Restatement. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 332

(1934).

However, the tentative draft of the second Restatement seems to

abandon this position in favor of the more lenient implied invitation test
which requires only an implied representation that the land is safe. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 332, Explanatory Notes at 59 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960).
This is in line with the current trend since the great weight of authority,
either by stretching the economic benefit test to absurd limits or by express
adherence to the invitation test, has abandoned Bohlen's position and returned
to the earlier, more inclusive invitation theory. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §
27.12 (1956).
2. 1 SHEARmAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE § 20 (rev. ed. 1941); Skolnick v.
East Boston Say. Bank, 307 Mass. 1, 29 N.E.2d 585 (1940); Dombrowski v.
Gorecki, 291 Mich. 678, 289 N.W. 293 (1939).
3. Lafredo v. Bush Terminal Co., 261 N.Y. 323, 185 N.E. 398 (1933); Potter
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terminates with cessation of control. 4 However, it has been held
that where one makes use of a dangerous place for his own benefit he
may be liable for injuries resulting thereon regardless of any right
of control.5 The owner's duty to invitees exists only while the visitor
is within the "area of invitation. '6 This area not only includes all
parts of the premises to which the visitor's business may reasonably
be expected to take him,7 but also encompasses a safe ingress8 and
egress. 9 However, if an invitee uses an improper means of approach
there is normally no liability,10 unless the occupier knowingly allowed
extends to hazards
such use to continue." The land owner's liability 12
he creates or maintains on abutting public ways.
The instant case would appear to extend the landowner's duty to
an invitee 13 by liberalizing the heretofore assumed principle that a
v. New York, 0. & W. Ry., 261 N.Y. 489, 185 N.E. 708 (1933); Cullings v.
Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931); Brown v. Cleveland Baseball Co.,
158 Ohio St. 1, 106 N.E.2d 632 (1952).
4. Cabranosh v. Penick & Ford, 218 Iowa 972, 252 N.W. 88 (1933); Upp v.
Darner, 150 Iowa 403, 130 N.W. 409 (1911); Palmer v. Morris, 182 Pa. 82, 37

Atl. 995 (1897). See also Bryson v. Hines, 268 Fed. 290 (4th Cir. 1920); Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Merrill, 65 Kan. 436, 70 Pac. 358 (1902); Glynn v.

Central R.R., 175 Mass. 510, 56 N.E. 698 (1900).
5. Kehlen v. Boston & No. St. Ry., 193 Mass. 341, 79 N.E. 815 (1907). Here
plaintiff was injured by a large crowd while attempting to board defendant's
carrier at the station house which defendant was permitted to use under
agreement with the lessee who had control over the platform. The court held
that "one who, though not strictly in control of a defective thing or dangerous place, yet uses it for his own benefit and his own purposes invites another
to enter it, may, if the other elements of liability concur, be held responsible
to the latter for an injury caused by the defect or danger." 73 N.E. at 817.
Massachusetts seems to have gone farther than any other state in liberalizing
the requirement of control when the Kuhlen case is considered in connection

with Carleton v. Franconia Iron & Steel Co., 99 Mass. 216 (1868). The Missouri
court in Cannon v. S. S. Kresge Co., 233 Mo. App. 173, 116 S.W.2d 559, 571

(1938) appears to dispense with the element of control as "not material," but
examination reveals that control was present, though not affirmatively alleged. In that case there was a defective doorway leading from defendant's
store to defendant's parking lot.
6. PROSSER, TORTS 458 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT, ToRTS § 343, comment b
(1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), ToRTs § 332, comment (1) at 67 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1960).
7. Pauckner v. Wakem, 231 Ill. 276, 83 N.E. 202 (1907).
8. Downing v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 192 Iowa 1250, 184 N.W. 722 (1921);
Hockschild v. Cecil, 131 Md. 70, 101 Atl. 700 (1917); Norton v. Chandler & Co.,
221 Mass. 99, 108 N.E. 897 (1915); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235
S.W.2d 609 (1950).
9. Nersiff v. Worcester County Institute for Say., 264 Mass. 228, 162 N.E.
349 (1928); Carr v. W. T. Grant Co., 188 Minn. 216, 246 N.W. 743 (1933); Royer
v. Najarian, 60 R.I. 368, 198 Atl. 562 (1938).
10. Sutera v. Palmieri, 79 Cal. App. 2d 359, 180 P.2d 414 (1947). The
rationale here can undoubtedly be traced to the fact that an invitee is not
within the area of invitation if he uses an improper means of approach.
11. Weinhold v. Acker, 49 N.Y. Super. 182 (1883), a~ff'd mem. 99 N.Y. 671
(1885). The theory of this is that since the owner consents to an improper
approach he bestows upon it the character of propriety and thus includes it
within the area of invitation.
12. O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 253 N.Y. 423, 171 N.E. 694 (1930).
13. The court seems to assume that the plaintiff was an invitee. Plaintiff is
referred to as a "patron" and as a "customer." A "patron" is defined as a
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landowner's liability is limited by the confines of those premises over
which he has control. 14 The cases cited by the court to support this
extension are readily distinguished.' 5 If there is any basis for the
decision it is to be found in Holmes v. Drew' 6 and Allen v. Yazoo
Mississippi Valley R.R.? In both of these cases liability was founded
on the misleading appearance of the property. 18 Similar also are the
area-of-invitation cases in which a private area presents the appearr
ance of a public one. 19 These cases, however, are distinguishable since
in all instances the property was actually controlled by the defendant
and the hazard created by him. The court's theory seems to stem
entirely from the mental attitude of the patron with respect to the
physical unity of the two lots.20 It found a duty to warn of a faulty

"licensee invited" or permitted to enter land for the purpose for which the
land is leased. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 359, comment a (1934). See also RE-

STATEMENT, TORTS § 332 where the term is said to be synonymous with a
business visitor. "Customer" is defined as "a person with whom one has
dealings .

. .

."

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY

(2d ed.

1955). Thus the court must have meant to classify the plaintiff as an invitee.
It is submitted that the court should have supported this classification rather
than proceeding upon their assumption. This is because the rule of Galveston,
H. & S. A. Ry. v. Matzdor, 102 Tex. 42, 112 S.W. 1036 (1908) appears to be
still in force in Texas even though it was questioned in Renfro Drug Co. v.
Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1951). In the Matzdor case the plaintiff
was injured in a stationhouse while saying goodbye to a friend. The court
held that an adult who is merely accompanying an adult invitee is not himself
an invitee in the absence of an economic relationship.
14. As counsel for defendant so ably stated in his brief to the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals the paucity of case law on the subject matter of control is
"attributable to an abiding belief in the minds of courts and lawyers that no
man is answerable in damages to one for injuries received on his neighbor's
land due to an alleged dangerous condition on the neighbor's land." Brief
for Appellee, p. 4.
15. Two of these cases concerned a tenant's liability for conditions on
adjacent property to which customers had access but which was controlled
by the landlord or by a fellow tenant. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Pedersen,
247 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1957); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d
609 (1951). In another of them the plaintiff fell over timber used to mark
the boundary line of two parking lots and sued both lot owners as joint tortfeasors. Galdwin v. Hotel Bond Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 106, 110 A.2d 481 (1954).
In one the patron was injured while leaving the store but while she still had
one foot inside the store. Viands v. Safeway Stores, 107 A.2d 118 (D.C.
Munic. App. 1954). Two cases concerned hazardous public ways used as
approaches to the premises. Shields v. Fair Food Stores, 106 So. 2d 90 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1959); Carleton v. Franconia Iron & Steel Co., 99 Mass. 216 (1868).
16. 151 Mass. 578, 25 N.E. 22 (1890). In this case the landowner negligently
paved a strip next to the street so as to give it the appearance of a sidewalk
and was held liable for injuries received by a passerby.
17. 111 iViss. 267, 71 So. 386 (1916). Here the landowner gave a private
way the appearance of a public one.
18. PROSSER, TORTS 430 (2d ed. 1955).
19. Morris v. Granto, 133 Conn. 295, 50 A.2d 416 (1946) (basement door
looke _ like entrance to toilet); Hall v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 63 Idaho
686, 125 P.2d 311 (1942) (basement door looked like door to other room).
20. This would appear to approach the idea of estoppel, but since estoppel
requires a change of position through reliance on the words or conduct of the
party estopped, Lingonner v. Ambler, 44 Neb. 316, 62 N.W. 486 (1895), it is
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approach situated on adjacent private premises even though defendant maintained other entrances on his own premises. 2'
The proposition announced by the present case-that an owner or
occupier of property may be held liable in tort for injuries received
on premises not under his control by an alleged dangerous instrumentality likewise not under control-is, indeed, unique. The type of
warning required to fulfill the owner's duty is not clearly defined by
the court. Landowners and insurance companies are thus left in a
state of uncertainty. The court in this case seems to have gone
farther than precedents justify with respect to the landowner's liability. This may perhaps indicate a trend; if so, it is a dangerous and
unwarranted trend.22

WILLS-CHARITABLE TRUSTS-ATTORNEY GENERAL AS
PROPER PARTY IN CONTEST OF WILL CONTAINING GRANT
TO CHARITABLE TRUST
A state attorney general filed a motion to intervene in a suit to
contest a will. The will made a substantial gift to a charitable trust.
The circuit court denied the motion. On appeal, held, affirmed. An
attorney general cannot intervene in a suit to contest a will involving
a testamentary grant to a charitable trust. Commonwealth ex rel.
Ferguson v. Gardner, 327 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1959).
Since the indefiniteness in identity and size of a group benefiting
from a charitable trust prevents it from protecting its own interest in
easy to see why the court did not specifically label it as such. Surely plaintiff's choice to cross the other lot would not have been affected by knowledge
that it was separately owned.
21. The court did not specify the type of warning required, thus failing
to establish with clarity the extent of the duty owed. It would appear, since
plaintiff was considered an invitee, that the type of affirmative duty imposed
would necessitate inspection of the adjoining lot. Such a duty could prove
impossible to fulfill, since there is no legal right to enter, much less inspect,
another's land.
22. The harsh result of the instant case could perhaps be modified by a
suit for indemnity against the adjacent landowner. The outcome of such a
suit would be unpredictable since it is difficult to state any general rule of
indemnification. A favorable result, however, would seem to follow from
Prosser's conclusion that "the duty to indemnify, like so many other duties,
arises where community opinion would consider that in justice the responsibility should rest upon one tortfeasor rather than another." PROSSER, TORTS
251 (2d ed. 1955). Also the distinction between active and passive negligence
would seem to predominate in this case.
On indemnity generally see Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552 (1935), 22 CORNELL L.Q. 469 (1937); Davis,
Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IowA L.
REv. 517 (1952); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81
U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932); Meriam & Thornton, In.'emnity Between Tortfeasors,25 N.Y.U.L. REv. 845 (1950).
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a legal controversy, the state is the only practical party to represent,
that interest. However, there is very little authority concerning
whether or not an attorney general is a necessary or proper party to
a suit concerning a will which makes a disposition to such a trust.
The few cases which have previously confronted the issue allow
intervention.' The Kentucky court cited no cases which explicitly
and directly deny it. Many states now direct the attorney general.
to prevent the abuse of an existing charitable trust.2 There are two,
primary reasons for this duty: the belief that the state or the general.
public is the true beneficiary, 3 and the absence of individual beneficiaries able to bring suit for its enforcement. 4 Any party who has a
pecuniary interest in the outcome of a will may usually intervene
in a case contesting that will.5 However, in a wills case affecting
1. In Ireland v. Jacobs, 114 Colo. 168, 163 P.2d 203 (1945) the attorney
general was allowed to bring suit against the administrator of the estate
to enforce what he believed to be a charitable trust. In State ex tel. Smith
v. Rector, 134 Kan. 685, 8 P.2d 323 (1932) the court allowed the attorney
general to contest a will as parens patriae for the protection of any unknown party. In Warren v. Sidney's Estate, 183 Miss. 669, 184 So. 806 (1938)
the court allowed the attorney general to contest a will because of the
possibility of escheat. In Watson v. Wall, 229 S.C. 500, 93 S.E.2d 918 (1956)
the attorney general was allowed to intervene in a case to construct a will
in order to protect the public interest. But see Spang v. Cleveland Trust
Co., 134 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio C.P. 1956) holding the attorney general not to be
a necessary party under Ohio statute. Prior to the instant decision, no case
has been found holding the attorney general to be an improper party.
2. Many states attempt to prevent mismanagement both under the common
law and statutes. See People ex rel. Ellert v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 45
Pac. 270 (1896); Crawford v. Nies, 224 Mass. 474, 113 N.E. 408 (1916); Attorney General ex rel. Prendergast v. Bedard, 218 Mass. 378, 105 N.E. 993
(1914); Thatcher v. City of St. Louis, 343 Mo. 597, 122 S.W.2d 915 (1938);
Trustees of Rutgers College v. Richmond, 41 N.J. Super. 259, 125 A.2d 10
(1956); Passaic Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. East Ridgelawn Cemetery, 137
N.J. Eq. 603, 45 A.2d 814 (1946); Ewell v. Sneed, 136 Tenn. 602, 191 S.W.
131 (1917). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 391 (1957). The
common law of Kentucky allows the attorney general to prevent abuse of
charitable trusts. See Attorney General v. Wallace's Devisees, 46 Ky. 611
(1847); Curling's Adm'rs v. Curling's Heirs, 38 Ky. 38 (1839); Moore's Heirs v:
Moore's Devisees, 34 Ky. 354 (1836).
3. "While the courts often talk of individuals who are to get charitable
benefits as 'beneficiaries,' strictly speaking the state is the only party having
a legal interest in enforcement, and the human beings who are favorably
affected by the execution of the trust are merely the media through whom
the social advantages flow to the public." Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 633 (1954). See
also Forer, Forgotten Funds, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 1044 (1957); 2A BOGERT,
TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 361 (1953); 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 348 (1956).
4. In Pratt v. Security Trusts & Savings Bank, 15 Cal. App. 2d- 630, 59
P.2d 862 (1936) the taxpayer was not allowed to bring suit to enforce a
charitable trust which called for erection of a building in a public park.
In Schaeffer v. Newberry, 287 Minn. 259, 35 N.W.2d 287 (1948) the court
held that the attorney general was the only proper. party to compel compliance with a will granting land to a village. In In re Burnham, 74 N.H.
492, 69 Atl. 720 (1908) the court held that members of the general public
lacked sufficient interest to sue for enforcement of public trusts. See
note 2, supra.
5. See In re Butzow's Estate, 21 Cal. App. 2d 96, 68 P.2d 374 (1937); Ewart
v. Dalby, 319 Mo. 108, 5 S.W.2d 428 (1928); In re Cohen's Estate, 356 Pa.
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the pecuniary interest of a charitable trust, the state is the only
party which can realistically or legally represent that interest. Therefore, it is doubtful that many courts which allow the attorney general
to prevent the abuse of an existing trust will deny his right to protect the same interest in a suit to contest a will.
In denying intervention, this court advanced four arguments. First,
neither a Kentucky statute nor its constitution specifically allows
the attorney general to intervene. The attorney general argued that
the constitutional grant to his office of all its common law duties and
authority should enable him to intervene. However, the court said
that this grant meant only the common law before 1607, and that
since there was no power before 1607 to intervene, the constitution
does not grant such power. 6 Second, the power to prevent abuse
of charitable trusts does not imply power to intervene in a will contest. The court reasoned that until the will is declared valid, the
charitable trust receives nothing to be supervised.7 Third, the duty
to intervene would be too burdensome and costly. The court dismissed as foreign to our principles of government the contention that
intervention should be a right rather than a duty.8 Fourth, the attorney general's intervention would contradict legislative intent by
.decreasing inheritance tax revenue. The court maintained that the
legislature would not have intended the attorney general to decrease
tax revenue since he must protect the interests of the soverign state.9
In effect, this decision prevents the state from protecting the public interest when a will granting property to a charitable trust is
,contested. The second and fourth arguments are the least convincing.
A testamentary grant to a charitable trust is not unrelated to the
management of an existing trust. In both situations the court must
-dealwith two principal interests: (1) the interest of the grantor which
lies in the fulfillment of the charitable trust and (2) the interest of
the public in receiving benefit from the grant. It makes little difference whether the interests are defeated before or after the trust
-comes into existence. The fourth argument, that the legislature never
intends to cause the attorney general to decrease tax revenue, is
:fallacious. The state is not an end in itself but the means to the end
of protecting and promoting the public welfare. If the grant is held
-valid, the public will receive the full benefit of the trust. However,
if it is defeated the public will receive only that portion taxed. The
-whole is better than its parts. As to the first argument-the absence
161, 51 A.2d 704 (1947); Jones v. Witherspoon, 182 Tenn. 489, 187 S.W.2d
788 (1945). See also AThSON, WILLS § 99 (2d ed. 1953); 95 C.J.S. Wills
§§ 362-68 (1957).

6.
7.
8.
9.

327 S.W.2d at 948-49.
Id. at 949.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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of legal authority-the court should have decided that the duty to
intervene in the will contest is implied by the duty to protect the
charitable trust, since the reason for the two duties would be the
same: the inability of public citizens to represent themselves. In
its third argument the court says that even if there were legal authority, the duty to intervene would be too costly. The court failed
to clarify its contention that the right but not the duty to intervene
contradicts our principles. Whatever the reason, it would probably
seem a greater contradiction of our principles to prevent an interested
party-the public-from being represented in a will contest. The rule
advocated by the concurring opinion-that the privilege to intervene
should rest with the discretion of the trial court, depending upon
whether such action is necessary to safeguard the interest of the
cestuis-would lead to a more satisfactory result. Intervention would
be questionable only if it unjustly prejudiced the other parties. However, there is no apparent reason why this danger should arise.

